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The Straits of Malacca is a vital passageway for the worlds economy. Vital supplies such 
as oil from the Middle East have to pass through the region on its way to the US. Hence, 
it has been an area of immense American strategic concern. These vital interests were 
threatened in the 1960s when, amidst great regional uncertainty, Britain, the US greatest 
ally announced its withdrawal from Singapore after 1971. As a result, the US had to 
support new allies like Australia and New Zealand to secure common interests in the 
Straits. 
  
This thesis examines the circumstances and factors that enabled the US to establish its 
network of friendly nations securing American strategic interests and concludes that it 
was the ANZUS treaty that provided a new defence framework for the region from 1969 
onwards despite the presence of other western alliances like the Five Power Defence 
Agreement (FPDA). How did the US secure its interests along the Straits of Malacca with 
the cooperation of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand? Vastly 
different in outlook and domestic circumstances, they reacted differently to American 
approaches, although all countries mentioned agreed that America was going to be the 
only reliable bulwark against Communism in Southeast Asia. This thesis believes that the 
countries aligned themselves with the US primarily because of a congruence of national 
interests or a commonality of threats. 
 
Another major argument that this work attempts to establish is the geographical factor 
that challenged special relationships and alliances. Tied down in Vietnam, the US could 
scarcely spare resources to safeguard its interests in the Straits. As Australia and New 
Zealand recognise themselves as Asia-Pacific countries: being affected by the same 
problems that plagued Southeast Asia, they aligned with the US, a pacific power, instead 
of Britain, a European entity. Although many historians deemed this switch in alliance 
painful, I believe it was inevitable in the face of threats. In the face of difficulties, 
pragmatism won over sentimentality. This was a fact that militarily weaker countries like 
Australia and New Zealand had to accept, although it did not necessarily mean they were 
 v
disadvantaged. Instead, they reaped benefits as strategic allies of the US: nuclear 
protection and permanent protection under ANZUS for Australia and economic benefits 
for New Zealand. In return, Australia and New Zealand provided what the US did not 
have: vital connections in the Straits. Australian and New Zealand deployments were 
warmly welcomed into the Straits but US forces were rejected. This was a major 
development because the Straits countries recognised the importance an American 
presence but at the same time, feared it. Australian and New Zealand forces thus acted as 
an acceptable surrogate that connected this region to US power. However, Australian and 
New Zealand forces were there not only because of its interests but to share the burden as 
a strategic partner of the US under the spirit of the ANZUS treaty. Political support for 
the US in Southeast Asia was important to encourage a continuing US presence, lest 
Australia and New Zealand find itself as the only western garrison left in a troubled 
neighbourhood. Although no American presence was in the Straits until 1990, it did not 
mean that American power was absent. Australia and New Zealand, though still in the 
Commonwealth, was unlikely to have deployed unless America requested and supported 
them. Australia and New Zealand forces brought a measure of stability to the Straits in 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
ANZUS in the Straits of Malacca 1965-69 
 
 
In the 1960s, if access to the Straits of Malacca was denied, the US war effort in Vietnam 
would be strangled. All military and commercial shipping traversing between the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans has to negotiate the Straits. Whoever controls the waterway thus has a 
great impact on US national interests1. Recorded during the June 1966 Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) Council Meeting in Canberra: 
 
(Rusk) said that he wanted to emphasise strongly the importance which 
the US attached to Southeast Asia, the Straits of Malacca (emphasis 
mine), etc. When Communist China came to power the US concluded 
Southeast Asia was of vital importance to the security of the free world. 
For reasons of geography, resources and prestige, the importance of 
Southeast Asia could not be under-rated.2  
 
Lyndon Bird Johnson (LBJ), stressing the importance of Southeast Asia in his memoirs, 
said of fellow Americans that: 
 
They have lost sight of the fact that almost 2 out of 3 human beings lived 
in Asia. I was certain that those ties would become more, not less 
important in the future. I wanted the American people and the world to lift 
their eyes to the Asia I felt was being born, in part at least as a result of 
our commitment to its security3. 
 
During the Cold War, American foreign policy aimed to secure allies worldwide to share 
the cost and burden of fighting Communism4. The US needed like-minded allies like 
Australia and New Zealand to contribute in areas like the vital waterway that extended 
                                                
1 FRUS-XXVII SEATO Council Meeting Canberra, June 27-8 1966. The Straits continues to be a key 
strategic area vital to US interests in the 21st century. The littoral states and the US often discuss how best 
to ensure the safety of the area against terrorism. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Johnson, Lyndon B The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-9 London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson 1972 p. 359. 
4 Whitcomb, Roger S The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition (Westport: 
Praeger 1998) pp. 111-2. See McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office New 
York: Harper and Row Publishers Inc. 1968 pp. x, 5-8, 20-22 and 148. 
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beyond American reach. Southeast Asia was too significant and too vast for the US to 
handle alone. Moreover, it was not too welcomed. America needed friends that were 
acceptable in the region like Australia and New Zealand when Britain, the incumbent 
guardian and faithful ally in Malaya, finally decided that it was no longer able to stand 
alongside the Americans in Southeast Asia anymore.  
 
Australia and New Zealands Response and the ANZUS Alliance 
 
Andrew MacIntyre said that great-power interests directed Australia and New Zealands 
decision-making in the 1960s regarding Southeast Asia5. Yet, Keith Jackson ranked New 
Zealands decision to remain in Singapore as one of the most significant foreign policy 
decisions because it was free of any association with a great power.6 (emphasis mine) 
Paradoxically, Australia and New Zealand was independently dependent  they were 
independent in spirit, but dependent in means. Setting aside their affinity with Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand had to decide which powers interests coincided with its 
own7. Geographical reality forced upon Australia and New Zealand the realisation that as 
Asian-Pacific countries, their interests and future must lie with Asia8. As early as Aug 
1963, New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, analysing New Zealand foreign 
policy, already believed that New Zealand could not depend on Britain forever: 
 
We have recognised that ties with the UK cannot secure New Zealands 
safety in the face of changed patterns of power. In the Pacific, we have 
sought protection with the US and Australia. In SEA, we have joined 
SEATO. Already, cords of attachment binding certain Commonwealth 
countries to Britainhave begun to fray. This tendencycould become 
dominant if Britain were to become inextricably involved with Europe.9 
                                                
5  Andrew MacIntyre Comprehensive Engagement and Australias Security Interests in Southeast Asia in 
Ed. Greg Fry. Australias Regional Security (NSW: Allen & Unwin 1991) p. 113. 
6 Jackson, Keith Because Its There in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (JSEAS) Vol. 2 1971 No. 1 
p.25. Note that ANZ decision-making for the 1969 decision was closely dependent on each other. See NAA-
A1383-18 ANZUS Council Meeting(ACM) in Wellington, New Zealand 5 April 1968. 
7 McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy pp. 123-5. 
8 J. D. B Miller Australia and Asia in Survival Vol. XI No. 8 August 1969 originally printed in 
Australasian Radiology (Sydney) p. 250. 
9 External Affairs Review (EAR) Vol. 13, Wellington, New Zealands External Relations in a Changing 
World 12 August 1963. This is a compilation of all government foreign policy statement and speeches 




Australia and New Zealand eventually identified more closely with American and 
Southeast Asian interests than British concerns, and depended on the ANZUS framework 
to secure US support for their Straits deployment. This enabled the US operating through 
ANZUS to become the cornerstone of Straits security.  To safeguard their stake, Australia 
and New Zealand depended on ANZUS:  adopting the paradoxical state of being 
dependent on American power through ANZUS to fulfil an independently conceived set 
of interests, thus ushering in an era of Asian-Pacific orientation that began to direct 
Australian and New Zealand foreign policy from 1969 onwards10.  
 
 
Time Frame: Why 1965-69? 
 
This dissertation focuses on a period of great uncertainty for Southeast Asia and 
Australasia. Within this period, Confrontation (1963-66) raged, Singapore separated from 
Malaysia (1965), the Vietnam War escalated, and the British announced their withdrawal 
from Singapore (1968). Although the withdrawal was planned for 1971, the period 1965-
69 was the crucial planning phase in anticipation of the forthcoming event. This was 
because prior to the change of British government in 1970, which led to the reversal of 
the East of Suez policy, everyone gave up hope on persuading the British to remain. The 
British forces remaining after the reversal however, were only a shadow of its former 
power11. A fundamental shift in the power structure took place when the British declared 
they were leaving. Unless one had the ability to predict, it was only sensible that prior to 
25 Feb 1969, all governments affected by the withdrawal sketch their contingencies with 
as little dependence on Britain as possible.  
 
Since Britains failure to hold Singapore during WWII, despite having an Australia and 
New Zealand over Mediterranean policy, Australias and New Zealands faith had 
                                                
10 One clear sign was the establishment of diplomatic relations and stations between ANZ-SEA countries. 
Past relations were not established on an independent basis because such ties were made under the 
Commonwealth umbrella. See Foreign Affairs Review, Wellington (FAR) Vol. 27 1973 PMs address to 
the Returned Services Association-NZ and SEA.  
11 Campbell, John Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Jonathan Cape 1993) p. 340. 
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weakened.12 Southeast Asia, by the 1960s was vital to Australia and New Zealand, and 
the British policy of Europe-first further damaged the fragile trust between the three 
nations. Australian defence planners considered Britains increasing association with the 
European Economic Committee (EEC) a liability because it allowed European countries, 
which had little direct concern for Southeast Asia, to obstruct Londons participation in 
the Straits13. The 1968 announcement concretised the perception that Britain was 
abandoning Southeast Asia in favour of Europe.  
 
1968 was also the year that SEATO, the alliance that was supposed to protect Southeast 
Asia against Communism, was labelled by the Australians as obsolete14. This study 
argues that SEATO, after 1968, was only an alliance in name. It existed only to the extent 
that the ANZUS countries had interests in the region i.e. ANZUS, not SEATO was the 
basis of the new security structure in the Straits.  
 
Since the May 1965 SEATO Council Meeting, the US, expecting French and Pakistani 
obstruction to its Vietnam War plans, considered Britain, Australia and New Zealand as 
its chief allies in Southeast Asia15. However, the following month, the New Zealand 
Labour Party (NZLP) argued that if New Zealand was obligated under SEATO to assist 
South Vietnam, then France and Pakistan were also required. Though the Opposition 
knew that those countries had, by 1965, little interests in Southeast Asia, the question of 
alliance participation was a convenient excuse to challenge the obligation. This, however, 
proved that strategic interests are more important than the text of a document16. SEATO 
obviously meant more NZ than to France. South Vietnam made requests on an individual 
basis to countries that had a stake in the region. The petition, no doubt made with US 
connivance, proved it was the spirit of ANZUS, rather than SEATO being activated to 
                                                
12 McIntyre, David W. NZ and the Singapore Base between the Wars in JSEAS Vol. 2 No. 1 1971 pp.19-
20. 
13 AWM-121-410/A/1-Defence Committee ANZAM Planning, ANZUK Senior National Officers Committee 
 Annex to JPS Report No 68/67 pp. 2-3.  
14 The Australian, (TA), 15 Nov 1968. The alliance was formerly ended in September 1975. 
15 FRUS- XXVII, Action Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk Washington, 30 March 1965. 
16 NZ Foreign Policy Special Report Southeast Asia (NZFPSRSEA). p. 16. 
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protect a common interest17. Any attempt to officially invoke the SEATO agreement 
would have brought open opposition from France and Pakistan18. There was no way 
SEATO would unite into a cohesive fighting force against Communism without a 
common set of interests.  
 
However, it was Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt, during his first visit in June 1966 
to Washington, who hinted that even Britain, ANZUS strongest ally, no longer shared 
ANZUS concern for Southeast Asia. He criticised the British and French, which did not 
support Vietnam through SEATO and praised the US and Southeast Asian nations that 
contributed because of a shared interest. Holt, in discussion with the Americans, asked 
how Britain, as a major power, could escape involvement in Vietnam under SEATO19. 
Dean Rusk, American Secretary of State, replied that he agreed that while Britains 
assistance was greatly desired in Vietnam after the Confrontation, he doubted London 
would agree20. Then in April 1967, British Foreign Secretary George Brown could not 
back up Britains promise to SEATO because London did not have the financial 
resources to maintain the two hypothetical battalions dedicated to SEATO reserves21. By 
9 October 1967, Paul Hasluck, Australias External Affairs Minister, said in a 
memorandum to Washington that Australia had no illusions about the real value of 
SEATO as an alliance: it was only a politically convenient platform to address ANZUS 
interests in SEATO. The note stated that Canberra wanted to maintain the credibility of 
SEATO for the dual purpose of giving ANZUS a legal basis to be involved in Southeast 
Asian affairs and to keep ANZUS alive as the principal guarantee of Australias own 
security.22 Finally, in April 1968, Rusk commented during the 18th ANZUS Council 
meeting that additional to Britains fading interest, Pakistan was only concerned with 
India and the Europeans were safe, prosperous and lazy: only ANZUS really cared 
                                                
17 The US requested for Australia and New Zealand assistance in Vietnam first because it wanted the 
responsibility for security to be a collective one. See Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno p. 106 and 
McNamara, The Essence of Security p. 153 Rusk also commented that the Vietnam War was a test case for 
collective security. See Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1999) pp. 434-5. 
18 FRUS-XXVII, Memorandum of Conversation  Washington 28 June 1965. 
19 FRUS-XXVII-I-24673/66 Memorandum of Conversation Washington, 29 June 1966. 
20 Ibid. 
21 FRUS-XXVII  Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 20 1967. 
22 FRUS-XXVII, Memorandum on the Defence of Malaysia by the Australian Minister of External 
Affairs, Washington, 9 October 1967.  
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about Southeast Asia23. By 1968, SEATO was only effective because of ANZUS24. Bruce 
Grant concluded in 1972 that SEATO failed because it: 
 
was not regional, but Western, and would depend on Western interests 
in SEA.as the interest of France and Britain have declined with their 
declining influence in the region, SEATO has become mainly the 
instrument of an American presence, especially in Thailand. SEATO has 
been important to Australias avowed objective of keeping Britain and 
America in the region, but it has never been as primary in the minds of 
Australians as the ANZUS Treaty25. 
 
Current Literature and Research 
 
This study attempts to understand how Australian, New Zealand and Southeast Asian 
response to threats led them to recognise and accept American pre-eminence in the 
Straits. It was not any single entity that safeguarded US interests in the Straits but the 
collective effort of both Asian and non-Asian allies. Despite its significance, little 
research was done on American interests and its impact on the strategic history of the 
Straits: most historiography remained focused on either Vietnam or US relations with a 
particular country e.g. US-Indonesia relations26. One possible reason could be due to the 
lack of access to primary sources from the US government on this part of the world. 
However, the release of Foreign Relations of the United States volumes XXIII (1995), 
XXVI, XXVII and Vol. I (2001 onwards) reversed the situation. 
 
With regards to Australia and New Zealand, much had been written on the subject of 
their involvement in Southeast Asia and the dilemma of loyalty i.e. strategic alignment 
                                                
23 National Archives of Australia (NAA) NAA-A1838-Department of External Affairs(DEA)-18th ANZUS 
Council Meeting (ACM), Wellington, 5 April 1968. 
24 Another important hint that SEATO was ineffective was when the Australians considered basing troops 
in Singapore after British withdrawal: they considered basing their troops under SEATO to garner greater 
US support. See NAA-A5842/443-Cabinet Minute Decision (CMD) no. 656 Foreign Affairs and Defence  
(FAD) Committee Canberra 25 August 1967 p. 6.  
25 Grant, Bruce. The Crisis of Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson 1972) p. 18 
26John Subritzsky concurs as he researched his book Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian 
and New Zealands Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation 1961-5 Great Britain 
Macmillian Press Ltd. 2000. Other texts focused on Vietnam such as Hartmann, Federick H. and Wendrel, 
Robert L  American Foreign Policy in a Changing World and Crabb, Cecil V. and Mulcaly, Kevin V 
Presidents and Foreign Policy Making: From FDR to Reagan. 
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with Britain or the US.27 This study adds to the historiography by arguing that finally it 
was geography not loyalty that altered Australia and New Zealands strategic stance. 
Although some earlier writers had touched on this topic, their analysis stopped short at 
the Vietnam War or studied the Vietnam conflict and the 1969 Singapore decision as two 
separated events. 1965 and 1969 were significant milestones and the former should be 
recognised as a prelude to the latter event because the tyranny of geography connected 
































                                                
27 See Australias Alliance Options: Prospect and Retrospect in a World of Change Camberra: ANU 
Central Printery 1991 and Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy NSW: Allen and Unwin 
1984 by Coral Bell and Grant, The Crisis of Loyalty. 
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Chapter 2 : Conceiving the Threat 
 
When Japan modernised its navy and army during the Meiji Restoration, even the signing 
of the Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1902 did not dispel Australias fear of Japan stirred by its  
meteoric rise as a major Asian power28. This treaty extended Japanese protection to 
Commonwealth fleets and maritime territory but Australia felt uneasy depending on an 
Asian: it was they instead of a white, which was we. This sentiment was 
demonstrated clearly by the welcome Australia extended to the Great White Fleet from 
the US in 1908, whose aims were clearly to check Japanese power in the Pacific29. This 
example illustrated that despite close historical ties, Britain and Australia did not share 
the same perception of threat: geographical difference implied that Australasia could be 
confronted with an Asian peril that Britain did not share.  
 
WWII forced two conclusions upon Australasian strategic consciousness. The first was 
the vulnerability of Australasia to threats from Southeast Asia and the second was the 
importance of an American presence to the security of the region30. Hasluck, External 
Affairs Minister and historian, reinforced these two conclusions clearly in his 1952 
treatise The Government and the People 1939-44. He wrote that Southeast Asia and 
Australasia were one inseparable defence unit, which needed both British and American, 
especially American power to defend. Unfortunately, Australia miscalculated American 
priority to fight Hitler first.31 Henceforth, Canberras faith in American interest in 
Southeast Asia was forever tainted with a tinge of insecurity. These powerful impressions 
left their mark on Australian and New Zealand foreign policy as Hasluck and Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies, two men who were involved in Canberras WWII episode, 
directed Australian foreign policy in the 1960s. This possibly explained the urgency felt 
by them to secure an American insurance for Australia at considerable cost. 
 
                                                
28 Michael OConnor, Mutual Security in Living with Dragons: Australia Confronts Its Asian Destiny ed. 
Sheridan, Greg( NSW: Allen and Unwin 1995) p. 85. 
29 Rawdon Dalrymple Continental Drift: Australias Search for a Regional Identity (Hampshire: Ashgate 
Publishing Company 2003) pp. 10-11. 
30 McIntyre, JSEAS NZ and the Singapore base p. 8. 
31 Hasluck, Paul The Government and the People 1939-4 (Sydney: Halstead Press for the Australian War 
Memorial 1952) pp.529-37. 
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The Evolution of Threats and Responses 
 
In the 1960s, Mao Tse Tungs support for the Vietnam War and Sukarnos alignment 
with Beijing confirmed Australias and New Zealands worst fears: Communism had 
encroached upon its neighbourhood. Recent Confrontation historiography suggests that 
Washingtons influence on Canberras and Wellingtons decision-making in Southeast 
Asia overshadowed Londons: Australian and New Zealand engagement in Borneo was 
the result of an American commitment and the imminent menace of Communism getting 
too close to Australasia, rather than British demands to defend Commonwealth territory. 
Canberra was notably more nervous because of its close proximity with Indonesia and 
approached Washington for a clear sign of support. T. B Millar argued that Washingtons 
assurance to support Australia convinced Canberra to sent troops in April 196432. He 
wrote, The collision (with Indonesia) came, above all, afterAustralia had received 
assurances from the US that if the situation got out of control the ANZUS Treaty could 
be invoked. John Subritzsky and Matthew Jones buttressed Millars thesis by tying 
Australia and New Zealands reluctance to fight Jakarta to the geographical importance 
of Indonesia to ANZUS: an importance less appreciated by Britain because it was 
withdrawing from this part of the Asia-Pacific33. Catley and Dugis further discussed the 
importance of Haslucks predecessor Garfield Barwicks controversial statement: the 
ANZUS treaty was applicable to Australian and New Zealand forces in Malaya. 
Although Barwick seemed discredited because Washington did not give an open 
commitment, subsequent documents and statements suggested that the US did indeed 
assure Australia and New Zealand of its support in Malaya. In 1963, Barwick pressured 
J.F Kennedy for an open assurance under ANZUS before committing forces for 
Confrontation. All he did was to give a vague commitment to consult in case of an overt 
attack on Australia before Washington decided on any course of action. Kennedys 
answer did not satisfy the Australians. Barwick said, The exchanges did not give us 
                                                
32 Millar, T.B Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977pp. 232-3 
33 See Jones, Matthew Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965 : Britain, the United 
States and the Creation of Malaysia New York: Cambridge University Press 2001 and Subritzky, John 
Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealands Diplomacy in the Malaysian-
Indonesian Confrontation 1961-5 (London: Macmillian Press Ltd. 2000). For further discussion, see 
chapter 4 on the US-Britain disagreement over Southeast Asia. 
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much on which we can rely on if and when any question of invoking article IV and V of 
the ANZUS treaty should arise.34  Was the US really reluctant to assist its allies if their 
forces were overwhelmed during the Confrontation?  
 
To understand US reticence despite the clues that it would support Australia, we have to 
understand the overall delicacy of the situation: the US, since the 1950s, was sensitive to 
Indonesia; an open US commitment against Jakarta might jeopardise US-Indonesia ties.35 
A telegram from Washington to the Australian embassy wrote, The problem is not so 
much of a commitment as to the possible use in a public statement of any commitment 
which was given. This could, for example, affect US relations with Indonesia and 
Philippines.36 
 
 Thus, Australias attempt to get a clear commitment in 1963 made the US more elusive 
and non-committal37. However, this episode clearly revealed Washingtons powerful 
influence on Canberra38. 
 
However, In October 1963, Barwick sensed that America should not be pushed towards 
an open and firm commitment. He said: 
 
My sense of the American position at present leads me to question the 
wisdom of trying through any conference next week in Washington to 
define the scope of ANZUS.... If we attempted to do so at this moment, we 
might obtain something less satisfactory than might emerge if we let the 
matter alone.39 
 
                                                
34 NAA-A1838-TS686/2/11-Pt.1-19 ACM 1969-ANZUS, 26 November 1969. See Appendix 1 The 
ANZUS Treaty. 
35 NAA-A1838-TS686/2/1-Pt.1-19 ACM 1969 Comment by Forrestal (advisor to National Security 
Council) to Australian Embassy in Washington, Washington Telegram 1846  16 July 1963. 
36 Ibid. 
37 NAA-A1838-TS686/2/11-Pt.1-19 ACM 1969-Note of the Minister of External Affairs to the Secretary 
12 February  1965. 
38 Earlier, Canberra followed Americas lead and supported Indonesia in West Irian over the Dutch despite 
its own misgivings about Jakarta. See Dalrymple, Continental Drift p.170. 
39 NAA-A1838-TS686/2/1- Pt.1-19 ACM 1969 Message from Barwick from NY (UN Telegram 1314, 7 
October 1963). 
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Cately and Dugis wrote, The original Australian statement of support for Malaysia had 
been made only after consultation with the US and in December 1963 Rusk had publicly 
declared American support for Australian policy towards Malaysia.40 Australia and New 
Zealand did not want to live with a massive, hostile neighbour and the US did not want 
the largest Southeast Asian country in the Straits to lean towards Communism41. London, 
in its haste to punish Jakarta became the odd one out. Only in 1965, when Sukarno finally 
exhausted American patience with his pro-Communist/anti-American antics did ANZUS 
finally concur that Sukarno needed to be put in place42. 
 
Further analysis of Canberra-Washington discussions starting from 1963 provides us with 
a context: in 1963, the US wanted Australias role and presence in Southeast Asia to 
extend beyond Confrontation and provide security assistance to Singapore-Malaysia. US 
support was unquestioned but it did not mean a blank cheque or limited to military 
support. If Canberra acted in line with US wishes, it need not get nervous about 
American support under ANZUS43. This coincided with Australias desire to play a 
greater role in Southeast Asian affairs as it recognised its destiny in Asia. 
 
The escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965 was another problematic development. 
Worried about Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand, following American lead, 
took the unprecedented path of joining a purely American war effort in Vietnam without 
British acquiescence. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara reflecting on American 
foreign policy of the 1960s said: 
 
Whether we like it or not, we are a Pacific power. We have important 
historical ties and commitments to many nations in the Western Pacific. 
                                                
40 Catley, Bob and Vinsensio Dugis The Kangaroo and The Garuda:Australian Indonesian Relations since 
1945 (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing House: 1998) p. 117. 
41 NAA-DEA, Press Reactions to ANZUS Talks, 25 July 1964. This document from Washington to 
Canberra highlighted Americas dilemma balancing the angry British and ANZs need for assurance. It 
confirmed that while Washington wanted London to act with restraint, it also despaired of Sukarnos 
actions. In a meeting with Holyoake, Johnson gave his tacit approval for support for ANZ forces in Borneo 
because it recognised that Jakarta was getting out of hand. 
42 Jones, Conflict and confrontation in South East Asia,p. 266. 
43 NAA-A1838-TS686/2/11-Pt. 1-19 ACM 1969-Comment by Sir Garfield Barwick to PM on 2 October 
1963, from NY, (UN telegram 1297). 
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We have therefore a vital strategic interest in that area, an interest we 
cannot ignore44. 
 
However, he noted Washington needed regional allies because it was impossible for the 
US to be the global gendarme.45 The US thought that having Australia and New 
Zealand by its side in Southeast Asia was only logical since Australia and New Zealand 
was part of the region. At the same time, Canberra and Wellington deemed that placing 
their security within the framework of American, rather than British, strategic concerns 
best preserved their interests46. However, even though Confrontation and the Vietnam 
War caused anxiety, China was still judged to be the main antagonist47.  
 
Chinas atomic achievement magnified the threat. In May 1965, Holyoake responded to 
Chinas nuclear testing by saying that We can only believe those declarations (of 
peaceful intentions) were cover for their real aims, the pursuit of revolution and power 
throughout Asia and the rest of the world.48 
 
The following year on 10 November 1966, Holt said he was worried about Chinas 
encroachment upon Southeast Asias peace and found, ourselves very much in accord 
with the fundamentals of US thinking.49 Just five days later, Chinas open support for 
Hanoi deepened the hostile impression when The People Daily reported that: 
 
The possession by the Chinese people of guided missiles and nuclear 
weapons is a great encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people who 
are waging a war of resistance against US aggression and for all the 
revolutionary peoples of the world who are now engaged in heroic 
struggles, as well as a contribution to the defence of world peace. This 
influence exerted by China is irresistible.50 
 
                                                
44 McNamara, The Essence of Security  p. 22. 
45 Ibid p.148. 
46 A. A Cruickshank in Changing Perspectives of NZs Foreign Policy, Pacific Affairs (PA) Vol. XXXVIII 
Spring 1965 p. 98. 
47 NAA, The Australian (TA), 9 January 1968.  See also FRUS-XVII General Discussion Washington, 16 
Jul 1964. 
48 EAR, Statement by the PM on Chinas Nuclear Test 16 May 1965. 
49 NAA, Melbourne Herald (MH), 10 November 1966.  




Similarly, New Zealands Secretary of External Affairs G. R. Laking said in 1967 that 
China, in wanting to expand its influence in Asia had,introduced new techniques of 
subversion and aggression to disturb an already fragile social and political fabric.51 
 
 Away from Britain, Towards the US 
 
During the uncertain 1960s, Australia and New Zealand found the terms of the ANZUS 
treaty too general to grant it the degree of security it needed52. Conscious of Southeast 
Asian vulnerability, Australia and New Zealand took out an American insurance: they 
thought that supporting US aims in the region was the surest way to ensure that the US 
would not abandon them in Southeast Asia53. The premium was a contribution to the 
American cause in Vietnam. In February 1965, Hasluck, foreign minister to Menzies and 
his successor Holt said that: 
 
For ourselves, we supported the US actions, and indeed were grateful to 
them, as we felt that so much of our own security was at stake. I added 
that if not for our other commitments we would be contributing more to 
Vietnam than we are already doing.54   
 
 
On 28 April 1965, Menzies heir apparent Holt, explaining Australias 
deployment said in Parliament that: 
 
It is fortunate for all countries of the region, not least Australia, that the 
US is prepared to commit its power and resources in this region. The 
willingness of the US is strengthened by the determination of the countries 
of the region to play their own part in collective defence in the region.55 
 
                                                
51 EAR  Problems of New Zealands Foreign Policy 5 April 1967. 
52 The ANZUS treaty deliberately left ambiguous the geographical boundaries of the treaty covered. This 
allowed room for consultations at any start of a conflict to prevent any party from being dragged into 
situations that were detrimental to its interests. See Watt, Alan The Evolution of Australias Foreign  1938-
65 (London: Cambridge University Press 1967) pp. 134-5. 
53 Millar,  Australia in Peace and War p. 208. 
54 NAA-A1838/682/4-DEA,  Vietnam  24 February 1965. 
55 NAA, Statement in Parliament, 28 April 1965. 
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Casting its lot with a larger power during times of peril was not new to Australia and 
New Zealand 56. But the Vietnam decision was momentous because it revealed a growing 
association with Asia and ANZUS, especially since Britain was not supportive of the 
US57. On 4 May 1965, Menzies, as Prime Minister, said in Parliament that It is in the 
continuing interests of this country to be regarded and to remain as a most valued ally 
of the US, which is, in this part of the world, our own most powerful ally.58 He stressed 
that it was preposterous to consider itself as a key ally and not support the US in common 
aims.  
 
During Holts first visit to Washington on 29 June 1966, he wanted to strengthen ties and 
discuss Southeast Asian military affairs. He remarked to the Washington Post that 
American intervention in South Vietnam gave heart to Asia like the Marshall plan in 
Europe59. Australia, with only 11.5 million people, was too small to defend itself 
effectively against large countries60. LBJ expressed his appreciation to have an ally 
closely associated with the region because it complemented Americas role in SEA61.  If 
Southeast Asia fell, Communism would be that much closer to Australia and New 
Zealand. Holts reply to critics about Canberras Vietnam policy in 1966 was, Saigon is 
closer to Darwin than Brisbane is to Perth.62 Thus, Australia and New Zealands 
association with Asia directly corresponded with an increased appreciation of the US in 
Southeast Asia. For example, in October 1966, in support of US actions in Vietnam, 
Australia wanted Washington to pay attention to the people who live here in Asia 
rather than to those far away in Europe who opposed American policy in Southeast Asia 
like De Gaulle63. Americas commitment in Vietnam was perceived as the forward 
defence of Australia and New Zealand in the tradition of Allied cooperation against Japan 
during WWII.  
                                                
56 Grant, The Crisis of Loyalty pp. 1-2. 
57 FRUS-XVII Memorandum of Conversation Canberra 21 Oct 1966. British support was also restricted 
because of domestic politics and a weak economic performance. See Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life 
of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx chapter XI.  
58 NAA, AH, 4 May 1965. 
59NAA, Washington Post, 1 July 1966. 
60 US News and World Report (USNWR), 24 October 1966 p. 39. 
61 FRUS-XXVII Visit of Australian PM Harold E. Holt Washington, 29 June 1966. 
62NAA, TA, 11 November 1966. 
63 USNWR, Vol. 61, 24 October 1966 p. 38. 
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In April 1967, Laking added, with regards to ensuring US continual assistance to a small 
country like New Zealand, that,  Now I think there is no question that a continuing US 
military presence is of the utmost importance in underpinning the security of the area, 
and we in New Zealand must do what we can to ensure it is maintained.64 Continuing, 
he emphasised, New Zealand has an opportunity to pursue a useful and constructive 
role. These relate primarily to the Asian area for it is here that the challenge to our future 
is most immediate.65 
 
By using here, Laking conferred a sense of closeness towards Southeast Asia that was 
not previously appreciated. New Zealand, in 1939, associated itself closely with Britains 
strategic interests by proclaiming that New Zealands defence was in the North Sea and 
Atlantic and not the Pacific66. C.A. Berendsen, the head of the Prime Ministers 
department said during the Pacific Defence Conference hosted to discuss defence 
concerns facing Pacific countries: 
 
There is no disposition in any quarter of New Zealand to question the 
basic fact that in any war in which the British Commonwealth was 
involved the decision would be reached in the European theatre, and no 
one in New Zealand would dream of suggesting that a fleet should come 
to Singapore if such a step might prejudice the situation there67. (emphasis 
mine) 
 
Singapore, closer to New Zealand than Europe, did not warrant as much concern as  
there in 1939. However, it would change by the 1960s. The significance of Southeast 
Asia to Australia and New Zealand was not lost on LBJ. He knew that the forces of 
                                                
64 EAR,  Problems of New Zealands Foreign Policy  5 April 1967 See also Statement by PM 11 
December 1965. EAR Vol. 15 1965. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Quoted from F. L. Wood The NZ People at War: Political and External Affairs Wellington, War 
History Branch, NZ Department of Internal Affairs, 1958 in Kennaway, Richard New Zealand Foreign 
Policy 1951-71(Wellington: Coulls, Somerville and Wilkie Ltd 1972) pp. 19-20. 
67 Ibid. It did not however, mean that NZ did not care about SEA. It was probably a dilemma for NZ to 
support the British in Europe while keeping an eye on the Royal Navys involvement in SEA. See 
McIntyre, JSEAS NZ and the Singapore base. 
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history were bringing a tide of change that would bind ANZUS and Southeast Asia into a 
common future. He said: 
 
It was apparent that both New Zealand and Australia were reappraising 
their roles in the world community and that a profound, and doubtless 
painful, readjustment was under way. These offspring of the UK had long 
looked to Britain and Europe for their trade, technology and political 
affiliation. But increasingly since WWII, and especially after their 
involvement in Korea and Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand 
recognised that their prosperity and security were intimately tied to the 
future of their neighbours in Asia. Britain was steadily reducing its 
commitments east of Suez. Australia and New Zealand were increasing 
and strengthening their links with Asia and the Pacific. It was a historic 




Although US support for Australian and New Zealand forces was pivotal to the decision 
to join the British in Borneo, that conflict was still fought under Commonwealth 
command. Thus, while it provided some indication where Australia and New Zealand 
were leaning towards, it was not a clear demarcation between Commonwealth and 
ANZUS alignment. The 1965 decision in Vietnam was a significant switch in alliance 
priorities because it exhibited the clear divide between Australia and New Zealand and 
British interests in Southeast Asia. It was also a prelude to the establishment of American 














                                                




Stakeholders in Southeast Asia: Australia, New Zealand and the Vietnam War 1965 
 
In 1965, Australia and New Zealand sent troops to Vietnam to halt Communist 
aggression as well as to present a united western front against potential threats. This 
combined front was more effective than a large military contribution because a wider 
message to Communist powers beyond Vietnam was sent. The scope paper for the 1965 
ANZUS Council Meeting recorded that the Americans wanted to, express gratification 
to Australia and New Zealand for their support in Vietnam as this demonstrates that the 
ANZUS partners are deeply concerned over the general situation in Southeast Asia.69 
David McCraw asserted that the New Zealands contribution to the war was purely a 
symbolic gesture because it was too small to make any difference in the overall order of 
battle70. Similarly, Australians amounted to about 1% of the allied forces arrayed in 
South Vietnam. However, for domestic justification, the US needed the countries that had 
a stake in SEA to chip in. On 5 March 1966, Rusk remarked succinctly, Are we suckers 
if others wont share the burden?71 
 
                                                
69 FRUS XXVII-ANZ-G1-Scope Paper Prepared for the ANZUS Council Meeting, Washington, 22 June 
1965. 
70 David McCraw Reluctant Ally: NZs entry into the Vietnam War in The New Zealand Journal of 
History (NZJH)  Vol. 15 April 1981. The University of Auckland, Auckland New Zealand p. 49. McCraw 
argued that New Zealand unwillingness to participate in the war was because it believed that the war cannot 
be won and the token New Zealand contribution would not make any difference, other than to please the 
US. Size as an indication of unwillingness to participate, however, was not a valid argument because the 
US was prepared to accept small contingents as a sign of political solidarity against Communism from 
allies and to placate domestic pressure. The political value far outweighed the military value. See FRUS-
XXVII SEATO Council Meeting Canberra 27-28 June 1966.  Also, the small New Zealand army lacked 
the ability to send a large force to Vietnam, thus a small contingent could mean a lack of resources rather 
than unwillingness. Moreover, New Zealand forces were not acting alone but in a collective effort with 
allies, thus its small size was not an issue since it was augmented by US/Australian forces. See statement 
by Prime Minister, 8 March 1967, EAR Vol. 17 1967. New Zealand was also involved in Singapore and 
Malaysia and the US and Southeast Asia appreciated this. See FRUS-XXVII, Scope Paper for the ANZUS 
Council Meeting. To Australia and New Zealand, stability in Southeast Asia included both Vietnam and 
Confrontation, which meant contributing to both the US and the British commitments. Thus, comments on 
New Zealand contribution to Vietnam have to take into consideration what was important to Australia and 
New Zealand in Southeast Asia, and not just the US effort in Vietnam.   
71 FRUS-XXVII Memorandum of Conversation Washington, 5 March 1966. p. 2 . 
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This statement was made in the context of criticising the British decision to withdraw 
from SEA after Confrontation, effectively ending its commitment to SEATO while the 
US was still fighting in Vietnam. London wanted to withdraw its forces and yet at the 
same time, retain its membership in SEATO. In January 1968, these two seemingly 
impossible objectives led the US News and World Report (USNWR) to conclude that 
Britain was a non-military member of SEATO72. The US hoped that Britain would 
contribute to the fighting in Vietnam, as Hanoi was a threat to everyone in the region. 
However, SEATOs principal European partners rejected the call because both had 
diminishing strategic concerns in SEA. Rusk regretted the unwillingness of Britain and 
France to take steps to meet the common danger. Instead, Australia , New Zealand and 
Southeast Asia, which felt the northern threat keenly, responded to Washington73. 
American anxiety matched Southeast Asian sentiments as Assistant Secretary of State for 
the Far East William Bundy also received feedback from American ambassadors in Asia 
that there was great fear from the region that should the US abandon Saigon, Southeast 
Asian nations might cave in towards Communist pressure74. Southeast Asia feared a bad 
peace, a peace in favour of Hanoi that allowed the US to end the war quickly. Rusks 
frustration with Britain personified the tension between Washington and London over the 
importance of SEA. LBJ had initially hoped to secure British support for Vietnam in 
return for American support over the Confrontation, but Londons inclination towards 
withdrawal soured the alliance. Thus, the US had only two other regional allies to call 
upon - Australia and New Zealand. Insightfully, Rusk labelled Australia and New 
Zealand as countries of Southeast Asia. He said, The principal concern about North 
Vietnamese aggression came from the nations of Southeast Asia: Australia, New 
Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.75  
 
The threat to Australia and New Zealand was a blessing in disguise for the US: it gave 
the US a symbolic ally. At its peak, a contribution of 8000 Australian troops and about 
                                                
72USNWR Vol. 64, 29 January 1968. The reasons why the British wanted to withdraw from Southeast Asia 
after Confrontation and the impact on ANZUS will be discussed in the next chapter.  
73 Rusk, D As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1999) pp. 454-5. 
74 (ed) Lester, Robert E Oral Histories of the Johnson Administration 1963-9. Fiche no. 92 Interview with 
William Bundy.   
75 Rusk, As I saw it p. 455. 
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550 New Zealand troops did not make much difference compared to 500 000 men 
deployed by the Americans. US involvement was crucial because Australia and New 
Zealand could never marshal the resources to fight the Communist threat at its doorstep.  
 
However, the decision to enter the Vietnam War was politically explosive; the internal 
debate only highlighted the importance of Southeast Asia to Australia and New Zealand. 
Australian and New Zealand Vietnam War historiography focused primarily on whether 
Australian and New Zealand foreign policy in Southeast Asia was tied to great power 
relations. Vietnam was a turning point because it revealed that Australian and New 
Zealand foreign policy were not tied merely to great power relations, but to Australasias 
growing relationship with Southeast Asia. It set the ground for crucial ANZUS 




























Chapter 3.1: Australia and the Vietnam War 
 
Menzies, the leader who brought Australia into the Vietnam War in 1962, believed in the 
Domino theory76. In 1965, when he sent combat troops to Vietnam, major print media 
indicated strong support for the governments decision. For example, The Canberra 
Times (CT) reported: 
 
The government has done a courageous and far-seeing thing in deciding to 
send Australian soldiers to fight in Vietnam, which cannot fail to 
strengthen the alliance between Australia and the US on which our safety 
ultimately depends.77 
 
The Melbourne Age (MA) said that support for the anti-Communist forces in Southeast 
Asia, namely the US and Thailand involved in Vietnam and the British in Malaysia, were 
inescapable obligations which fall on us because of our geographical position and treaty 
commitments and friendships.78 
 
And the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) summed up both the MA and the CT by saying 
that the deployment was right and inevitable.79 However, the strongest praise for 
Menzies came from LBJ. The MA reported that, The president is very mindful of what it 
means to have your soldiers and ours stand shoulder to shoulder, for the fourth time this 
century, fighting for freedom.80 
 
In August 1965, he reinforced the issue during Parliament: Menzies highlighted the 
danger to Australia if Communism should absorb Southeast Asias people and 
resources, and as a result, he could not take any chances but to whole-heartedly support 
the US intervention and escalation in Vietnam81. At that session, Menzies repudiated the 
                                                
76 The Domino Theory, as explained by Eisenhower argued that one country falling to Communism would 
automatically lead to its neighbour falling next like a set of toppling dominoes. See Public Papers of the 
Presidents Dwight Eisenhower The Presidents News Conference, 7 April 1954. 
77 NAA-M2576-DEA, Battalion for Vietnam 30 April 1965. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 NAA, MA, 3 November 1965. 
81 NAA, Statement by PM in the House of Representatives 18 August 1965.  
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argument that the Domino Theory was simplistic by saying that as Australias leader, he 
had to believe in it as any responsible leader had to consider the viability of any threat to 
his country, especially the threat of Communism encroaching into Australasia via 
Southeast Asia82. The Domino Theory then, was a perceived by many policy makers in 
Australia and New Zealand as the dark reality facing Australasia in the 1960s as Australia 
found itself faced with the possible overwhelming Communist forces emanating from 
China, down Vietnam and through Southeast Asia. A volatile Indonesia next to Australia 
made the distant fear of China very real83. Though the theory might have seemed like an 
American idea, Percy Spender, the Australian foreign minister in 1950, already suggested 
that Australia would be threatened should Indo-China fall, with the rest of Southeast Asia 
following. This model was a credible scenario to the Australian government because it 
was not without precedence. It was based on Japanese success and strategy during 
WWII84. New Zealands foreign Minister T.C. Webb reiterated the same lesson learnt 
from the Japanese invasion that flowed from Indo-China to New Guinea and almost into 
Australia in a public statement on the importance of Southeast Asia to New Zealands 
security on 26 May 195485. 
 
Before the elections, in March 1966, Menzies successor, Holt reiterated the 
governments stand that the first concern of the leadership was the security of the 
country86. Australia was fighting in Vietnam because that ultimately decided whether 
Communism would triumph in Southeast Asia or not. He further claimed that because 
Australia was not isolationist, it had responsibilities that extended into Southeast Asia. 
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Many considered Menzies, who ordered conscription in 1965, harsh because the country 
was tired of long wars. In fact, Menzies agreed in his memoirs that conscription and 
deployment of conscripts overseas were undesirable, but he had to do the unthinkable 
because he thought the situation warranted it87. Elaborating, he said: 
 
But we decided, as we were becoming increasingly uneasy about 
Southeast Asian affairs, particularly the intransigent activities of 
Confrontation under Sukarno, and the Vietnam War, that there should be 
compulsion to serve abroadto help produce a safe environment for our 
neighbours, with whom we are bound to have a close association with as 
the years go by.88 
 
This quote underscored the point that Asia, not the US in Vietnam or British in Malaysia 
per se, was the focus of Australian concern. The Australian Labor Party (ALP), in March 
1966, claimed that deployment and forced enlistment were cruel, and Holt was callous to 
the Australian citizenry. He responded on 25 March 1966: 
 
It is an unwarranted assumption for any member to claim he has a 
monopoly of concern for the young people of this country. The 
government is also concerned at the nations security.89 
 
The same day, Arthur Calwell, the Opposition leader, wanted to settle this issue through a 
referendum in parliament: he lost by 47 to 60 votes90. Most of Australias political 
parties, except Labor, supported the governments call to defend South Vietnam in 
196591. The Australian Country Party stated that year in June in its annual address that for 
Australia to merit vital US commitment, Australia must support her great and powerful 
ally of preventing further encroachment by Communism in Southeast Asia.92 
                                                
87 Menzies The Measure of the Years p. 76. 
88 Ibid. p. 77. 
89 Daily Telegraph, 25 March 1966. 
90 Melbourne Sun, 25 March 1966. 
91NAA, SMH, 25 March 1966. See also Hansard, 23 March 1966. 
92 NAA, Annual address, Australian Country Party 23 June 1965. 
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Five days after the referendum, Holt said, in challenging conscription, the ALP were anti-
US and anti-ANZUS, since it wanted to limit Australias ability to support the US effort. 
Calwell promptly rebutted him by claiming that the ALP believed that Australia should 
honour its treaties, but should also periodically review treaties and alliances93.  
 
Further proof that the Oppositions anti-conscription/anti-deployment stand during the 
November 1966 elections did not win support was found in the MA. On 16 November 
1966, it commented that,  it is on conscription that Mr. Calwell has revealed his greatest 
weakness. He offers no argument, no reasoning to support his view that conscription is 
immoral.94 
 
The Sydney Daily Telegraph remarked the same day: 
 
Mr. Calwells policy on Vietnam, stripped of prevarications would mean 
deserting the Americans and the South Vietnamese people. This would 
jeopardise and probably destroy the whole alliance between America and 
Australia, and it would destroy Australias credit among the anti-
Communist nations in Southeast Asia.95  
 
In 1966, despite the unpleasantness of conscription, the public voted for Holt and Calwell 
resigned. When Gough Whitlam, Opposition deputy leader succeeded Calwell after the 
elections, he clarified that Labor drew a distinction between the use of conscripts and 
regular troops for deployment to Vietnam. Referring back to the 1 May 1966 
Parliamentary report, he said that enlistees were classified as a special category for 
consideration96. He argued that according to Calwell, the draftees would be brought 
home as soon as possible if a Labor government was established. But a year and half 
later, by early 1968, he believed the withdrawal of all Australian troops was another 
matter. It was an issue that should be calculated not just within the realm of Australian 
politics and sentiments, but in the overall consideration of US-Australian ties. Whitlam 
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95 NAA, The Sydney Telegraph, in TA, 16 Nov 1966  
96 Ibid. p. 19-20 
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stressed that Labor did not want the US to be humiliated in Vietnam. Henceforth, any 
troop withdrawal would not be a unilateral action on Australias part without considering 
its impact on future US-Australian cooperation and ties, as well as Australias future 
position in Southeast Asia97. By February 1968, after Tet, the ALP wanted neither 
immediate withdrawal from Vietnam nor to repudiate the US alliance98. Even though 
Labor was against the deployment, it recognised that once the troops were there, they 
could not be withdrawn without having serious repercussions on the American alliance as 
well as the future of US commitments to Asia. Thus, any action it took would have to 
consider these points. For Australias sake, the US must be successful in the region. This 
was the prudent call to make since the majority of Australians still felt a threat to national 
security in the 1960s99. If the ALP did not address this fear by alluding to the importance 
of ANZUS, it would be political suicide. While the morality and practicality of 
deployment/withdrawal was debated from 1966-68, Labor agreed with its rival on the key 
areas of the US alliance and Australias role/credibility in Southeast Asia. This rare 
moment of bi-partisan agreement indicated that Australia could not divorce itself from 
Southeast Asia. 
 
Whitlam summarized in his autobiography the dilemma faced by the Opposition party in 
the 1960s: it was against the moral and politics of the war, not the US or ANZUS. He 
claimed that, All of us were entangled in Labors dilemma; how to oppose US 
intervention without opposing Washington; how to denounce the war without denouncing 
the US.100 He added: 
 
There were in fact, no difficulties of substance in the relationship. The 
US is important to Australia as it is the most powerful and vital nation on 
earth. Australia is important to the US as it occupies a crucial position on 
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the earths surface and in relation to the heavens above and the waters 
below.101 
 
The Opposition believed that when Holt gave the US  a blank travel warrant to go all the 
way with LBJ in 1966, the government came under US influence and was no longer able 
to formulate a policy of its own102. According to the ALP, the core issue behind the 
deployment of conscripts was really the issue of the independence of Australian foreign 
policy. Labor stressed that it feared an unequal alliance that pressured Australian 
conscripts into fighting Americas war. This concern arose because the Menzies 
government claimed initially in 1964 that conscription was a response to an Indonesian 
threat to Australian interests in New Guinea103. Holt replied that was not true because the 
governments decision was both in response to SEATO and Australias need for security 
in Southeast Asia104 
 
His reply buttressed the stand that Australias security could not be cleaved apart from 
Southeast Asia: Australias involvement in Vietnam was legitimate and independently 
assessed; it was a calculated move to protect Australia from afar, thus Australia was not 
bending to anothers will. Conscription and deployment were not implemented to please 
the US but to protect Australia, a perfectly acceptable reason given the fact that Australia 
had never faced so many threats before; threats from Vietnam and closer to home, 
Indonesia. The severe situation called for the drastic sacrifices called for by the 
government. The Australian response in 1965 to the conflict in Vietnam was one of 
consistency: Australia had been combating Chinese Communism since the 1950s in 
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 Liberal and Labor Policies towards Asia: Different, yet Common 
 
Fundamentally, the difference stemmed from the disagreement over what constituted a 
threat to Australia, and therefore, its appropriate response106. By 1968, it was clear that 
Menzies and Holt had always viewed China as a threat but Whitlam and Calwell 
disagreed. The ALP judged the Chinese threat perspective as something too similar to 
American views. Whitlam saw China as an unlikely threat to Southeast Asia because he 
perceived that in Vietnam, China was not the main supplier of weapons but Russia107. 
Whitlam claimed that this was evidence that China, while verbally aggressive, did not 
threaten Southeast Asia and hence, Australia. Furthermore, he suggested that if the 
Vietcong could overrun 36 cities during the Tet offensive, there must be a very strong 
domestic element to the war, as opposed to Liberals claim that it was a China-inspired 
threat108. Since he considered it a civil war resulting from a weak society, Whitlam 
thought that military intervention was not the solution. By focusing on strengthening 
local friendly regimes economically, Canberra could provide the best defence against 
subversion and instability109. As it coincided with American aims, Australia could do it 
under the American umbrella. Calwell advocated this but it gained credence only during 
Whitlams leadership because the US, after Tet, no longer had the willingness to defend 
any additional Southeast Asian country by force. To ALP, the next best policy for 
securing Australian interests would be to get the US to create the conditions that would 
make war unlikely again in Southeast Asia 110.  
 
China was the contradiction between Labor and Liberal. The government in the early to 
mid-1960s saw the alliance as a guarantee against Beijing because the Americans would 
be held in a debt of honour to defend Australia should the need arise.  
 
On 21 December 1967, LBJ, in memory of Holts passing said that: 
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The US would go all the way with Australia Australia is one of the 
principal reasons that we have committed our power so fully in this part of 
the world. Whether this kind of commitments (ANZUS) are right or 
wrong, we have them. I intend to honour them. I want to thank you for 
your help in Vietnam.111 
 
But since the Opposition did not consider China as a threat, the US was perceived as a 
means to supplement Australian efforts to Southeast Asia through aid. In 1968, Whitlam 
stressed that Australia should sway the US in this direction. Commenting on the ANZUS 
alliance that year in a public speech on foreign policy, he said, The other and more 
important part of the alliance is the spirit and attitude, it means the kind of influence we 
should try to exert on the US a role in our region.112 
 
 Because of Australias support for the US in Vietnam, Whitlam believed that Canberra 
was in a position to influence Americas Southeast Asian policy in Australias favour.  
He continued, Our proper role (in Southeast Asia) is not to shut ourselves from US 
influence but to use and expand our own influence with the US to assist her in playing a 
fruitful, meaningful and peaceful role in our region.113 
 
By 1968, Whitlam believed that Australia should assert its independence by using its 
troop contingent in Vietnam as a bargaining chip to manipulate the Americans according 
to Australian wishes i.e. withdraw the troops as a signal that military means were not 
working and the US should try other means, led by Australian economic and diplomatic 
initiatives114. That way, he could fulfil Labors aims of troop withdrawal while at the 
same time leave behind a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia achieved through aid and 
diplomacy without splintering the alliance. It could also show up the Liberals to be too 
compliant towards the US and prove Labor to be a stronger Australian party.  
 
                                                
111 FRUS-XXVII, Meeting of the President with the Australian Cabinet 21 December 1967. 
112NAA, Whitlam, Beyond Vietnam  p. 26. 
113 Ibid. p. 37. 
114NAA, Transcript of Television Interview, 18 February 1968. 
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Both views reflected not just party differences but also more critically, changing times. 
By 1968, Australian foreign affairs commentators no longer believed that China would 
invade southwards because it needed to tidy up its own home115. Economic circles by 
then even advocated the official recognition of Beijing because China was emerging as a 
major wheat buyer, accounting for some 42% of wheat exports.116. However, should 
China ever invade Southeast Asia, nothing short of US assistance would help117. Yet, this 
distinct possibility had been averted because of Canberras steadfast support for 
Washington.  
 
ALPs approach towards the US was twofold: it continued to reap the benefit of nuclear 
protection earned by the Liberals support for the US. However, without an overt threat to 
deal with, Australias aims, according to Whitlam, were to built a stable and strong 
Southeast Asia that could withstand the perceived threat of subversion rather than 
invasion. This flowed conveniently with the new Nixon doctrine118.  
 
This strategy was viable only after Tet. Up till 1967, Canberra still thought that 
contributing forces to Vietnam was the only way to secure an American insurance. In 
1966, some Southeast Asian leaders like Singapores Goh Keng Swee regarded the US 
intervention as a reprieve for them to strengthen themselves against the Communist 
threat119. Thus, Australian officials believed in 1967 that their countrys stand must deal 
with both the problem in Vietnam, and also address the perceptions of the Southeast 
Asian leaders if it wanted to ensure stability in Southeast Asia 120.  
 
                                                
115 TA, 14 December 1968 and USNWR, Vol. 64 15 April 1968. China was in the midst of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
116 TA 23 December 1968 and FRUS-XXVII Call on Johnson by the PM of Australia. Memorandum from 
Rusk to Johnson, Washington 1964. This offended Washington but it suggested that Australia had 
interests outside the scope of ANZUS and when it was advantageous to do so, Canberra could act 
independently of the US. 
117 TA, 1 February 1968. 
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Whitlam saw the possibility of US support in fulfilling this aim. See The American Presidency Project 
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119 NAA-3024/7/1-DEA, Dr. Gohs Views on Vietnam 7 July 1966.  
120 NAA, AH, 9 Mar 1967 p. 564  See also NAA, AH, 25 August 1970 p. 441. 
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Interestingly, Whitlams strategy to engage the US in economic aid instead of military 
contribution to Southeast Asia was first advocated by his predecessor Calwell in 1965. 
However, in 1965, this strategy was not viable because the Chinese threat was still 
perceived to exist: the US insurance was deemed crucial for Australias survival. Calwell 
knew that his critics considered his plan too idealistic in the context of the early to mid-
1960s121. But by 1968, this was no longer the case122. 
 
Yet, how realistic was Whitlams strategy, as compared to Holt-Gortons? In the light of 
a retreating Britain, the US did not want to be the sole contributor to peace, and Australia, 
more linked to Asia than Europe, did not want to be left without a protector123. Although 
aid and diplomacy might work in the long run, it did not win wars then. There must be a 
viable long-term strategic framework for stability before aid would work Moreover, it did 
not give the US and Southeast Asia the visible show of support it badly needed in 1968 
after Tet124. Hasluck, responding to public queries said neither a purely military solution 
nor economic one would work. Instead, a two-pronged strategy should be applied. He 
said: 
 
We were giving economic aid to Vietnam before we were giving military 
aid and we hoped that there was no need to give any other form of aid, but 
it was made painfully clear that until, by military means, terror was 
checked and security established, no lasting economic and social 
advancement could be achieved.125 
 
Canberra, in needing to satisfy both the Southeast Asians and the Americans, realised 
there was no easy solution to this foreign policy dilemma. Therefore, the situation in 
Southeast Asia forced Australia to clarify its own regional aims, role and alignment in 
Southeast Asia. 
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University Democratic Socialist Club 16 May 1966. 
122 This set the stage for an ANZ contribution in 1969 that need not be large. Its symbolic presence was 
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124 FRUS-XXVII Visit of Australian PM, John G. Gorton Washington 29 May 1968.  
125 Hasluck Paul, Questions and Answers on Australias participation in the Vietnam War John Echols 
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The Vietnam War issue, though hotly debated, was not without areas of concurrence. The 
agreement whether implicit or explicit was Australias identification with Asian and US 
interests. In principle, most politicians and citizens were never completely against 
Australias involvement126. Analysing Oppositions defence against charges that it was 
anti-US, Liberals accusation seemed more political than substantial127. Labors policy 
was impractical because it did not address US and Southeast Asia immediate concerns. 
Withdrawal might have weakened US resolve in Southeast Asia, thus damaging the vital, 
confidence-giving ANZUS alliance that Australia needed.  
 
However, Whitlam, in arguing for a greater Australian role in Southeast Asia, nailed the 
issue conclusively. In 1968, he said, 
 
Australians can neither trade nor travel unless there is orderly progress in 
the archipelagos to their north and in the adjacent periphery of Asia. 
Australians have yet to learn to think regionally Our destiny is 
inextricably entwined with the people around us. We are Asians by an 
irrevocable act of geography.128 (Emphasis mine) 
 
Ironically, this only served to prove that Labors policy was too idealistic for that 
moment because it would appear that Australia did not share SEA and US defence 
burden. 
 
In conclusion, Australia did not find its relationship with the US strained because of 
Vietnam. The war, unpopular from a moral point of view, was an unpleasant necessity if 
Australia identified with the security issues of the region. The deployment controversy, 
though divisive, highlighted where Canberras interests really lay. The cooperation with 
                                                
126 Even the Archbishop of Australia urged the maintenance of strong ties with the US. See MA 25 April 
1963. Domestic protests against the governments support for the US was not virulent. For instance, the 
majority shunned student movements in key Australian universities to raise funds forf the Communist in 
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issues. See NAA, Prime Ministers election eve statement for the newspapers MH and The West 
Australian, Letter from Whitlam to F. E. Chamberlain, State Secretary, Australian Labor Party 18 
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128 NAA, Whitlam, Beyond Vietnam p. 34 and p. 37. 
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the US set the stage for a greater level of cooperation in the Straits when the British 
announced they would leave in 1971. By then, Australia was ready to play a greater and 






























Chapter 3.2: New Zealand and the Vietnam War 
 
New Zealand sent troops to South Vietnam in May 1965 amidst great controversy. This 
decision sparked off  one of the longest foreign policy debate in the history of the New 
Zealand Parliament, giving testament to the importance and divisiveness of this 
decision129. This chapter will discuss the reasons for and against deployment and argue 
that the debate did not weaken ANZUS in Southeast Asia as long as the Holyoake 
government recognised that New Zealands national interests were embedded there. New 
Zealands deployment was a turning point in more ways than one. In the article New 
Zealand and Southeast Asia, Keith Jackson, in 1971, asserted that Britain was where 
New Zealands true loyalty laid, but it helped the US because of practical reasons130. It 
was a turning towards ANZUS interests, and an important precursor to its decision to 
remain in the Straits without the British. Richard Kennaway argued in New Zealand 
Foreign Policy 1951-71 that Wellingtons decision to remain in Singapore independent 
of London was a breakthrough in foreign policy. However, I would argue that while the 
decision to join ANZUS was the first breakthrough in foreign policy to join an alliance 
without Britains leadership, the Vietnam decision was more significant because New 
Zealand, for the first time, chose to a deployment that was outside of Britains interest 
and leadership. The dictate of self-interest was beginning to clearly overrule 
Commonwealth loyalties. This set the stage for New Zealands future deployment in 
1969 to remain in Singapore. Although some might argue that New Zealand made this 
decision because of its dependency on ANZUS, I believe that Wellingtons collusion 
with US-Australia was an unmistakable sign that New Zealands association with Asia 
took precedence over British affairs. This decision had to be considered within the 
political developments between New Zealand and Britain in the 1960s, when Britain was 
perceived to be aligning itself with Europe by joining the EEC. New Zealand had to 
decide whether ANZUS or Britain was more in line with its own stake in Southeast Asia.  
On the other hand, it also sowed seeds of doubt in the value of the US alliance within its 
                                                
129 NZ Hansard (NZH), 10 June 1965 p. 326. 
130 Keith Jackson, New Zealand and Southeast Asia in Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 
(JCPS), Vol. IX 1971 Leicester University Press, pp. 7-8. 
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population. Thus, the Vietnam War issue was a complex double-edged sword that cut 




In March 1965, when news of US bombing reached New Zealand, citizens wrote strongly 
to the Evening Post (EP) against the American use of weapons like napalm and white 
phosphorous bombs. These emotionally charged letters condemned the use of these 
weapons and accused the US of escalating the conflict towards a possible world war.131 
According to some of these critics in the press, US involvement prevented a non-violent 
solution to the war. Even before the parliament debates in May-Jun, domestic critics 
already questioned the government on the wisdom of supporting the inhuman USA in 
the Vietnam conflict and wanted the government to withdraw from Vietnam132. 
 
On 27 May 1965, Holyoake stirred the hornets nest when he announced New Zealand 
would send combat troops to assist in the struggle against Communist aggression in 
South Vietnam.133 This decision sparked off a heated controversy for about three weeks 
in parliament. The debate was important because deployment, which involved a cost, 
represented true interests. The argument revealed the fundamental issue of where New 
Zealands interest really laid. 
 
One day after Holyoakes announcement, the Opposition argued vehemently in the House 
of Representatives that, given the severity of the matter, while the Prime Minister was 
within his right to deploy troops, he should not have done so without discussion in 
Parliament. According to Labour, Holyoakes decision-making without consulting 
Opposition views proved he did not care about the feelings of the population that the 
                                                
131 The Evening Post (EP), 31 March 1965. 
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133 NZH, 27 May 1965. See Roberto Rabel,  The Dovish Hawk: Keith Holyaoke and the Vietnam War in 
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New Zealand Labour Party  (NZLP) represented134. The Labour party advocated that aid, 
instead of military contribution could eradicate poverty, the root of Communism. The 
idea enjoyed tremendous popular support over military intervention because it gave a 
progressive and humanitarian feeling to its contribution135. On 28 May 1965, Arnold 
Nordmeyer, the Labour Leader responded in Parliament on two key issues, 
Economic/Social Aid over Military and the preference to contribute under UN collective 
defence rather than SEATO and the US. Regarding the aid, he said, 
 
Communism cannot be defeated by military forces alonebut 
Communism can be defeated in so far as the fortunate nations of the world 
- and New Zealand is one of them - are prepared to give aid to the 
people of these areas, so that their living standards can be improved and 
conditions created in which it is impossible for the seeds of Communism 
to grow.  We support that form of aid rather than the military aid which 
the government has proposed.136 
 
Furthermore, the NZLP felt that the status of the Vietnam War was unclear: it was not 
clear whether it was a civil war or invasion. If the indigenous National Liberation Front 
(NLF) was fighting against a corrupt and undemocratic government, the New Zealand   
had no business there, even under SEATO137. This issue of invasion was crucial 
because it legitimised New Zealands entry into the conflict under SEATO. Thus, those 
who opposed the war cited the confusion and revulsion towards perceived American 
terror tactics as the main reason why New Zealand had no place in Vietnam138. However, 
according to the government White Paper New Zealand Military Assistance to the 
Republic of Vietnam 1965 (NZMARV) published to explain its decision, Communist 
deviousness was attributed to be the cause of this confusion. Since this White Paper was 
published by Holyoake to justify his decision, it could be suspected to carry with it 
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136 NZH, 28 May 1965, p. 14. 
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of International Affairs 1968, pp. 21-22. 
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certain bias139. It revealed that Communists agents, who were born in the South but 
defected to the North because of ideological reasons, were specially selected by Hanoi to 
lead the insurgency. This tactic apparently worked because it convinced critics that it was 
an insurgency rather than an invasion140. 
 
Holyoake replied that while aid should form the mainstay of Wellingtons assistance 
because it was by nature a peaceful and non-militant country, the situation, invasion 
rather than civil unrest, made it impractical because security must first be established 
before re-development could be meaningful. Moreover, the North Vietnamese spurned 
UN involvement or any negotiations unless its terms were met141. New Zealand fact 
finders from both sides of the House who visited South Vietnam to understand the 
situation there before Parliament began reinforced the first point. The mission members 
were convinced that Communist aggression made the need for establishing security 
through military means a priority142.  
 
On 28 May 1965, ironically, Opposition member James Faulkner agreed with the 
government and affirmed in Parliament that, Sometimes guns must be used to build a 
law and order structure.143 Then on 3 June 1965, Another Opposition member, Basil 
Arthur, said in Parliament that: 
 
There is no doubt in my mind that the situation in Vietnam has been 
brought about by blatant aggression by the forces of North Vietnam 
(NVA) in breach of the 1954 Geneva accord. North Vietnam by 
initiating and encouraging guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam and later by 
arming the Vietcong is to blame for the present state of hostilities there. 
In my opinion the US is legally honouring its commitments in South 
                                                
139 However, its findings corresponded with sources, governmental, opposition, and foreign, thus 
reinforcing its reliability. For example, see M. Ghazali Shafie Malaysia: International Relations: Selected 
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140 NZMARV 1965 p. 46. 
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142 The Argus Leader (AL), 18 July 1965. 
143 NZH, 28 May 1965, p. 33. 
 36
Vietnam by helping the country resist aggression.We should also 
substantially increase our constructive aid to this country. It must be borne 
in mind that there cannot be development without security.144 
 
Merely tackling poverty alone could not solve the problem because the Vietcong were 
already amidst the people and without security, the Communists could undo the good that 
civilian aid did145. North Vietnam not only armed and encouraged the Vietcong, they also 
infiltrated regular troops into the South at the rate of approximately 7000 a month146. 
Mission members also believed that the civil war argument emerged because New 
Zealand reporters covering the war could not differentiate between the Vietcong and the 
North Vietnamese147. Government defence of its decision was robust because from the 
offset, Holyoake asserted that New Zealands best defence against a belligerent and 
hungry China was SEATO and ANZUS, both anchored by the US148.  
 
Still, Labour believed that war was futile and should be resolved diplomatically. 
However, this presupposed that Hanoi was opened to negotiations149. But early as 1964, 
communications already broke down between Washington and Hanoi. On 27 May 1964, 
LBJ told a senator on the phone: 
 
Well, we are ready to confer with anybody, anytime, but, that conferences 
aint going to do a damn bit of good. They aint going to take back and 
behave. We tell them every week, we tell Khrushchev, send China, Hanoi, 
and all of them word that we would get out of there and stay out if they 
quit raiding their neighbours, and they just say, screw you.150 
 
Elaborating on this point in the NZMARV, the North Vietnamese, in 1965, insisted that 
all internal affairs must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in 
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accordance with the program of the NLF, without any foreign intervention.151 A peace 
settlement established purely on Communist terms was unacceptable. It was also a 
violation of SEATOs constitution that its members help one another in times of 
aggression.152 William Bundy also believed that Hanoi had laid too much in the war to 
quit without total control.153 
 
Another argument put forth on 28 May was the need for collective defence under the UN 
instead of a adopting a pro-US policy of involvement. Aware of New Zealands 
insecurity and limited ability for self-defence, the Opposition believed that the countrys 
security should be found under UN auspices 154. Labour also stressed the need to resolve 
the conflict through the UN. However, it was an impractical choice of resolution simply 
because North Vietnam rejected it. With Russia and China in the UN Security Council, 
hidden agendas and conflicting national interests would frustrate an impartial ruling on 
the Vietnam War155. LBJ himself was frustrated because the US, in 1964, could not get a 
majority vote in the Security Council in its favour156. Well-intentioned as it may be, 
Labours proposition to pin hopes on the UN seemed naïve and revealed an ignorance of 
the true nature and complexities of the problems presented by the Vietnam War. Mark 
Pearson commented in 1989 that NZLPs ideas were outdated and political debate 
itself was not well-informed in Paper Tiger: New Zealands Part in SEATO 1954-77.157 
 
 The question of an independent New Zealand foreign policy, raised by the NZLP on 9 
Jun 1965 was a two-fold, bitter fight as the Opposition questioned the governments 
autonomy from US influence, whereas the Prime Minister charged that Labour was going 
back on its word to honour New Zealands alliance obligations158. The challenge laid in 2 
problems, firstly Labour deemed Confrontation as New Zealands main concern and 
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secondly, the belief that the Vietnam insurance was superfluous because the US would 
defend New Zealand anyway159.  
 
Regarding Malaysia, the Opposition said earlier in May 1965, Our main concern is that 
we cannot undertake full obligations to Malaysia if we enter into commitments in South 
Vietnam. Because geographically Malaysia is far closer to us and to Australia than is 
South Vietnam.160 
 
This concern seemed valid as the AL criticised Holyoakess overseas defence 
commitments in July 1965: it stretched New Zealand resources too thinly to defend its 
home territory161. However, Holyoakes reply revealed very tellingly where his 
government had pitched New Zealands defence.  The AL reported on 19 July 1965 that, 
Holyoake told the conference that government defence policy was realistic and would 
enable the government to plan an effective role in the defence of the South Pacific and 
Southeast Asia.162 
 
By July 1965, clearly, to Holyoake, the defence of New Zealands interest was 
synonymous with the American and British-led defence of Southeast Asia. Note that 
there was no mention of defending New Zealand home territory, although the critique 
addressed his concern there.  Although New Zealands contribution to Malaysia might tie 
Britain to Southeast Asia, its support for the US hinted of insecurity towards London 
because in 1950, the British government acknowledged that in the event of war, Britain 
could no longer defend New Zealand 163. New Zealands decision to join a non-British 
effort based on its own assessment of interests signalled a major shift in foreign policy 
calculation164. The splitting of New Zealand forces between Malaysia and Vietnam also 
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revealed that Wellington recognised that the onus to defeat Communism in Southeast 
Asia did not fall onto New Zealand but to the US and Britain. Their numbers were 
insignificant compared to their partners: about 1700 in Malaysia and approximately 200 
in Vietnam in 1965.  
 
All foreign policy decisions are hazardous gambles165. No one could predict the future 
outcome of the Vietnam War, but New Zealand leadership, fearing Communism and 
given its constraints, saw no alternatives. It responded as best and as quickly as it could. 
Holyoake concluded the debate in Parliament on 9 Jun 1965. He said: 
 
The point is, what better policy can we follow? This government after 
anxious and very careful consideration came to the conclusion that the 
American government was right and deserved active support from the 
New Zealand government. In reaching that conclusion, it was not 
necessary to believe that the Americans are always right or entirely 
right. The most we can say is that, after very carefully weighing all the 
considerations, we came firmly to the view that this was the right and 
proper course to follow.166 
 
Despite the unresolved disagreements, both parties agreed that the troops needed the full 
support of the nation. At the same time, the NZLP absolved itself from the responsibility 
of deployment. On 10 June 1965, it said, The Opposition is disturbed that the decision 
has been made, but nothing will be done by members on this side to prevent anything 
being made available to those troops while overseas. The decision is the governments 
and the governments alone.167 Although Holyoake ended the 1965 June parliament 
debate, the controversy continued beyond 1965 as the issue of New Zealands future 
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Beyond Vietnam: An Independent Foreign Policy 
 
Another major point brought up by the Opposition that transcended the 1965 parliament 
was whether ANZUS would drag New Zealand into foreign conflicts that involved no 
immediate national interest168. This could harm New Zealands sense of autonomy and 
invite retaliation. They even argued it was good that someone resisted Communism, as 
long as it was not New Zealand. In April 1967, Laking answered critics in a landmark 
speech on New Zealand foreign policy: Wellingtons international relations must be 
realistic due to its limitations in Asia. Thus, New Zealand needed to make ANZUS 
viable. Taking into account all perspectives of the debate, he concluded that, A foreign 
policy must not only be enlightened and skilful-it must be hard-headed and practical. 
Good intentions are no substitute for good sense.169 He reminded his audience, 
 
But it is as well to remember that New Zealand is of little strategic 
importance to anyone. in a period dominated by great power rivalries, 
we are one of the few countries which could be regarded as expendable. If 
we do not make our contribution to wider international stability, no one 
is going to give much thought to helping us preserve our continuing 
independence.170 
 
 However, Laking conceded that this led to dependency, as New Zealand was only 
effective within an alliance and not as an independent military force. In 1969, 
demonstrating consistency, Holyoake reinforced Lakings earlier views. He said: 
 
I must say I find it odd that some people, in one breath, can dismiss the 
ANZUS or Manila treaty as useless because it doesnt really commit the 
US to help us and objectionable because it commits us inescapably. If 
there is aggression... we maintain our judgment and voice on what the 
measures should be in the actual circumstances. A good ally is not 
subservient; he has judgment and a voice, and uses them; but he is 
prepared to take up his share of the burden.171 
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Although small and dependent, New Zealand in the 1960s demonstrated greater 
autonomy than in the 1930s. Laking believed that New Zealand evolved from being a 
former, small, British colony, to an independent and crucial ally of the US because it 
could offer to Washington an independent view, experience dealing with Southeast Asian 
countries and most importantly, a common set of interests. Very importantly, he linked 
New Zealands alignment with the US as a result of New Zealands search for identity 
within the world community. The result led to identification with US interests in Asia 
over its relationship with a European Britain. Comparing Holyoakes words to Prime 
Minister Michael Savages famous speech of 1939 in response to the outbreak of the 
European war: 
 
Both with gratitude for the past, and with confidence in the future, we 
range ourselves without fear beside Britain. Where she goes, we go, where 
she stands, we stand. We are only a small and young nation, but we are 
one and all a band of brothers, and we march forward with a union of 
hearts and wills to a common destiny.172 
 
The difference was clearly in the decision-making criteria. Although New Zealand did 
not change its strategy of aligning itself with a great power, it altered its reasons for doing 
so. In the 1960s, the policy did not change, just the area of focus. A consistent part of 
Australian and New Zealand strategy was to fight and hopefully win by hitching onto a 
larger ally. Just as Australia and New Zealand could not hope to defeat Hitler or Hirohito 
alone, but alongside the Anglo-American forces, Australia and New Zealand hoped to 
defeat Communism. In the 1960s, it was an Asian-anchored destiny that determined that 
New Zealands best bet was the only bet, the US. The fact that New Zealand forces were 
still part of the strategic reserves in Malaysia meant that ties with Britain were still 
valued. However, things were never the same again. Despite the misinformed opinions 
and emotional responses over Vietnam, both the government and Opposition did not 
disagree on the importance of Southeast Asia.  The NZFPSRSEA, a special report 
commissioned in 1968 to understand New Zealands foreign policy for Southeast Asia in 
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the 1960s, explained New Zealands dilemma in terms of a cleaving from the British 
fold: 
 
It is a novelty for New Zealand to find herself in this position without the 
kind of solution which active British participation would confer. New 
Zealand may lean on the US, but she does not have with the US a bond of 
union similar to the emotional unity which has bound her to Britain and 
has made it right and proper for her to support British actions173.  
 
Regarding the comment on superfluous alliances, the NZFPSRSEA said: 
 
(Labour) thought that its (formal alliances) importance as providing a legal 
framework for US military action in the area as marginal; since as in the 
case of most powers, US conception of its interest in the area for the most 
part determines its actions, not the text of a rather vague treaty174. 
 
 Proponents of this argument held the lofty view that New Zealand need not bow to the 
pressure to contribute to any adventures it found distasteful. However, the government 
had adopted a more pragmatic approach as outlined in Lakings landmark 1967 speech: 
He elaborated that despite New Zealands close ties with the US in the 1960s, ANZUS 
was only one of the many alliances made by Washington after WWII. It was unrealistic 
to expect Washington to place high priority on Wellington unless it contributed more 
than other allies. In this sense, defence became pro-active. By assuming mistakenly that 
New Zealand was indispensable, Wellington would have effectively surrendered its 
independence because it would be at the mercy of others calculations of what constituted 
indispensable. Instead, a pro-active approach taken to contribute to American aims 
enabled New Zealand to influence the degree of reciprocal support from the US i.e. New 
Zealand had bargaining power. Being independent was different from being aloof from 
the needs of others. Rather, autonomy stemmed from the ability to choose whom to help 
and for what calculated gain in return. For example, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
representative addressing Otago University on New Zealand -US ties said that New 
Zealands contribution in Vietnam had influenced the US to favour New Zealand 
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economically because Britains admission to the EEC would cost New Zealand greatly in 
trade. This was because the US appreciated that for small allies to fulfil their military 
contributions towards common causes, they needed a little economic help175.  
 
Ending the Vietnam Debate 
 
A. Cruickshank emphasised that by finally supporting the deployment, albeit grudgingly, 
the Opposition recognised that the US was New Zealands ultimate guarantor in 
Southeast Asia. Despite opposing New Zealands involvement, NZLP would not have 
withdrawn the troops in the 1960s because that would seriously undermine Americas 
position in Southeast Asia, to the detriment of New Zealand176. Wellington was aware 
that Singapore and Malaysia perceived the situation with great apprehension For 
example, Lee Kuan Yew told the US Vice-President in 1967 that if the US gave up on 
Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia would fall and he himself would be publicly hung by 
the Communists in the public square within 3 years.177 Thus, a troop contribution was 
needed to bolster its Asian allies spirit. This elevated New Zealand to a position of 
influence as a stakeholder in Southeast Asia because of Wellingtons visible commitment 
to fight Communism alongside the Southeast Asians. Holyoake believed the deployment 
promoted New Zealand to the Southeast Asians instead of offending them as some 
Opposition members claimed because the latter believed that New Zealand should not be 
perceived to be interfering in SEA affairs178.  
 
Nevertheless, the intense parliamentary debate in 1965 heralded the beginning of a 
schism. The views of the Opposition represented the views of a sizeable portion of the 
population. This meant that while the US was still very much regarded as a valuable ally, 
disillusionment was stealthily seeping in. Yet, this did not weaken Wellingtons resolve 
in Southeast Asia. In a conversation between LBJ and Holyoake in Washington just after 
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the hostile parliamentary exchanges, Holyoake told the president that the average man in 
the street actually had an unclear view of what Vietnam stood for179. The Prime Minister 
was confident that any opposition from the ground would not be sufficient to challenge 
his stand regarding the Vietnam War and US alliance180. Continuing to assure the 
President, he claimed that his populaces initial emotional resistance to the decision was 
slowly being replaced by logic and the governments advocacy for the US was 100%. He 
believed the major newspapers supported the government and this swayed public 
opinion181. However, support finally snapped in 1968 after Tet182. With Tet, the moral 
cause of the war seemed lost and there was no more justification to remain loyal to the 
US in this fight. Stuart McMillan labelled this as a crisis of the conscience183. New 
Zealands moral support for the war crumbled with the rest of the world in 1968, as 
evidenced by the public protest during the 1968 SEATO Council Meeting held in 
Wellington to discuss Southeast Asian defence issues184. Yet, when Holyoake visited 
Washington again in October 1968, New Zealand was hailed as a strong contributor of 
aid and troops to Southeast Asia and a close ally of the US185. It seemed that in spite of 
the strong opposition and adverse public opinion, New Zealand supported the US as long 
as the New Zealand government perceived Southeast Asia to be an area of strategic 
interest. The New Zealand -US alliance remained unaffected in the 1960s only because of 
a genuine interest in Southeast Asia. New Zealands role in the Vietnam War signalled a 
major shift towards intervening in regional affairs without Britains leadership. By 
leaning towards ANZUS and contributing to Southeast Asia beyond the Commonwealth, 
it set the stage for New Zealand to play a greater role when the British withdrew from the 
East of Suez. 
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Chapter 4: The British Withdrawal East of Suez 
 
 
In 1965, the Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman announced that only a 
lunatic would remove the British base in Singapore because it was the only bastion 
against aggressors186. Three years later, Britain announced it would depart by 1971 
because of financial reasons187.  Although Confrontation had ended, the situation in 1968 
was bleak: the Vietnam War continued without the anti-Communist forces gaining an 
upper hand. The disturbing state of affairs in Southeast Asia presented a problem: no one 
wanted to replace the British-sponsored stability in the face of uncertainty, but the void 
could not be left unfilled. Why did Australia and New Zealand eventually opt to remain?   
 
The 2 Problems: The Indonesian Confrontation and the British Withdrawal East 
of Suez 
 
The Indonesian Confrontation: US-British Aims Concerning Indonesia 
 
To the casual observer, the ANZUS-British disagreement seemed to originate from 
Londons decision to leave the Straits. While this choice was disagreeable to the stated 
aims of its allies, a deeper problem existed between London and Washington over 
Indonesias geographical role and influence on the Straits of Malacca. Comprehending 
this difference is vital to understanding how Australias and New Zealands involvement 
in Southeast Asia was sealed through American support rather than British.  
 
The US officially concluded in 1964 that despite the Communist shadow hanging over 
Jakarta, Indonesia was more important than Vietnam for its long-term interest in 
Southeast Asia because of its large population, great resources and strategic position188. 
Thus, even though Washington did not approve of Sukarnos Confrontation, up till mid 
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1965 it would not do anything premature that would jeopardise its long-term relationship 
with Jakarta. Briefing LBJ before his meeting with Tunku in July 1965, Rusk said: 
 
We have no illusions about Sukarno. But Indonesia, now and in the future, 
is of the utmost importance to all of us. Our aid to Indonesia has been 
sharply reduced. It is, however, permitting us to maintain some contact 
with key elements in Indonesia, which are interested in and capable of 
resisting a Communist take-over. We think this is of vital importance to 
the entire free world.189 
 
American interests in Indonesia extended beyond Confrontation. This contrasted with 
Malaysias stand, which reflected British thinking that the conflict must be dealt with 
forcefully. By stressing that Indonesia is of utmost importance to all of us, Rusk 
highlighted the importance of a non-Communist Indonesia in the post-Sukarno era that 
benefited all pro-western, anti-Communist countries in the region. However, London was 
afraid that a pro-Jakarta American foreign policy might lead to a sell out of British 
concerns in Southeast Asia 190. Due to the clash between London and Washington, there 
existed the danger of British objections to LBJs attempt to rein Sukarno in. In January 
1964, LBJ sent Attorney General Robert Kennedy, his political rival, to facilitate a 
meeting between Sukarno and the British. It was a difficult task and LBJ relished the idea 
of his contender failing: but ironically, Indonesia was also important enough for LBJ to 
wish Kennedy success191. The president sent him reluctantly because Kennedys ties with 
Sukarno were close and Sukarno cherished personal diplomacy192. Even though 
Kennedy got the Indonesian leader to announce a ceasefire, London still disapproved of 
the forbearance demonstrated by Washington towards its enemy 193.  
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 Herein lies the difficulty; managing British and American interest in SEA with regards to 
Indonesia. Supporting Britain could jeopardize American interests in Indonesia by 
pushing Sukarno towards the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI. On the other hand, 
Washington needed Londons support for its Vietnam policy.194. By late 1964, London 
thought that when Indonesian-US relations plunged, America would withdraw support 
from Indonesia. However, Washingtons tolerance towards Indonesia despite the way 
Sukarno treated American properties unsettled the British and strained US-British ties. 
The US was aware that eventually it might be provoked to action under ANZUS, which 
the British hoped. Events between 1964-5 spiraled out of control when Sukarno 
challenged and attacked US interests in Indonesia, prompting Washington to believe that 
the Indonesian president was undeniably anti-US and Communist: and decided on a 
course of action against him. American documents for the period of December 1964-
September 1965 were labeled Sukarnos Confrontation with the US instead of 
Confrontation with Malaysia. Washingtons ire against Jakarta was increasingly 
evident and the US government prepared for a post-Sukarno era. When the coup ended, 
the US was quick to give support to Suhartos military regime195. However, the crucial 
point is the fact that American action was directed against the Communisation of 
Sukarnos regime and its threat to US interests rather than British persuasion and 
alliance. 
 
Thus, the two allies disagreed how Confrontation should be resolved. The US favoured 
an Asian solution: Southeast Asian nations resolving the issue through negotiations. 
The British on the other hand, favoured an approach that included a Commonwealth 
presence at the negotiations because London believed that any settlement regarding this 
area would affect British bases in Singapore and Malaysia, and consequently affect 
western strategic interests, especially those of Australia, New Zealand and Britain196. But 
this arrangement was not feasible because the bases in Singapore and Malaysia were the 
source of the problem, and the British were afraid that Indonesia might demand the 
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removal of those bases as a condition to end Confrontation. Indonesia did not recognise 
Malaysias independence, since it was handed to them. Sukarno aspired to be the leader 
of newly decolonised Afro-Asian nations, which stood up against colonialism. Therefore, 
he adopted a tough stand against Malaysia to show that he was worthy of his credentials 
He perceived this state of affairs as a continuation of colonialism under a different guise, 
posing a threat to Indonesia197. If the base was sacrificed for peace, it would effectively 
leave Commonwealth interests defenceless198. Thus, a British-led solution might lead to 
an escalation between Australia, New Zealand, UK and Indonesia as London lost its 
patience and objectivity, leading to the invocation of ANZUS through Australia and 
New Zealand. This was something the US tried hard to avoid.199 This would benefit the 
British greatly because US involvement would enhance its power.200 While LBJ 
instructed Kennedy not to compromise the existence of these bases, he was to make it a 
strictly Asian solution by not interfering in the negotiations, lest the US get drawn into 
the conflict201. Kennedys mission of 1964, in summary, was to use all means to persuade 
Sukarno that Confrontation would lead eventually to a situation where the US had no 
choice but to be involved. He was to stress that although the US was keen to continue aid 
to Indonesia, Jakarta should not place the US in a spot where it cannot continue with its 
assistance i.e. maintain its interests in Indonesia. As early as 14 January 1964, Kennedy 
was instructed by the White House that: 
 
While the president would like to be able to continue certain assistance 
programs to Indonesia under this Act (Foreign Aid Act), he cannot make 
the necessary determination that such assistance is in the interest of the 
United States unless Sukarno can give you (Kennedy) assurance that there 
will be a shift away from military confrontation, and at a minimum by 
agreement to a cease-fire pending negotiation.202 
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Aid was committed for the long-term interests of the US in Indonesia. Therefore, any 
move that threatened aid to Jakarta was in fact threatening the maintenance and 
strengthening of US interests in Indonesia. Confrontation had the opposite effect of 
forcing the US to act against Indonesia in line with world and domestic opinion, but a 
hostile US was not likely to get anything good out of Indonesia in the future.  The US 
was balancing a delicate situation where its fundamental interests in Southeast Asia 
differed from its traditional ally.  
 
Supporting Britain in Principle, not in Practice      
 
With an eye on its own interests, American support for the British was more in principle 
than actual as Washington avoided being entangled in Confrontation. Washington 
suspected that London wanted it to take over British commitments in the region by 
escalating the Indonesian threat to the US, but this was what America wanted to prevent 
at all cost203.  Since the US was already committed in Vietnam, it wanted the British to 
continue shouldering a share of the burden of defending Southeast Asia against 
Communism. But Britain wanted exactly the opposite i.e. an increased US role in the 
Straits. While Britain did not state explicitly that it wanted to use US power to deal with 
Sukarno, it could be inferred that a greater US involvement against Indonesia was 
favourable both in defraying the costs as well as to add ballast to British action. A US 
military presence as significant as the Seventh Fleet would leave no doubt in Sukarnos 
mind that the US, a country he considered less hostile, had turned against him. Thus, 
despite the fact that Sukarno was increasingly anti-US by 1964, LBJ refrained from 
acting against Jakarta. On 31 August 1964, a memorandum from the McGeorge Bundy to 
LBJ said: 
 
 We are on a sharp downward curve in US/Indo relations, largely because 
of the continued threats to crush Malaysia and our necessary opposition 
to it. Sukarno has adopted a far more overtly anti-US lineAt the same 
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time, the very fact that we are on a slippery slope makes it all the more 
important not to burn all our bridges to Indonesia: (1) with Vietnam and 
Laos on our SEA plate, we can ill afford a major crisis with Indonesia too 
now, (2) we ought to keep few links, however tenuous, to the Indo 
military, still the chief hope to blocking a Communist takeover; (3)we 
want to keep dangling the prospect of renewed aid; (4) we do not want to 
be the ones who trigger a major attack on US investments there.204 
 
Thus, on 2 September 1964, the instructions given to American representatives in Britain 
dashed English hopes: 
 
We cannot give them a blank check and pick up the tab for the escalation 
by the use of US forces without the fullest and most precise understanding 
between the Heads of Government. If this is what they (British) have in 
mind, they must not take anything for granted in an area where we have 
our hands full and with minimum allied participation.205 
 
 
Justifying himself against increasing pressure to act against Sukarno, on 22 January 1965, 
LBJ said to Congressional leaders that, all US military assistance going to Indonesia is 
being provided because it is in our national interests, not theirs206. On 25 January 1965, 
LBJ wrote to Wilson explaining US policy towards Indonesia, 
 
In short, Indonesia seems to be moving rapidly towards more aggressive 
policies externally and towards Communist domination at home... I feel 
strongly that we cannot let Indonesia continue along its present path 
without exhausting every possible measure to turn it from catastrophe207. 
 
However, Wilson was not persuaded. On 30 January 1965, Bundy said to LBJ that, 
(Wilson) takes a very dim view of it.208 From this point onwards, there was little 
meeting of minds between the Americans and British regarding Indonesia. The lack of 
British support for the Vietnam War after Confrontation further widened the gulf between 
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the two allies. Britains unsupportive attitude towards its comrade was the manifestation 
of a deeper problem; a combination of strategic, political and financial problems that 
eventually alienated Britain from ANZUS. 
 
British Withdrawal East of Suez 
 
British national interests in Southeast Asia no longer outweighed the cost of its defence 
commitments to the region and one way out was to pass the cost to the US, Australia and 
New Zealand209. A British Cabinet Committee minute as early as 1963 recorded: 
 
There was no clear economic interest (emphasis mine) for the UK in the 
Far East. Our main concern was to secure the general stability of the area 
as a barrier to Communism and the containment of Indonesia. There was a 
reasonable chance that we could retain a base in Singapore into the next 
decade but nevertheless ANZAC should do more to relieve the UK of 
some of its burdens.210  
 
By 1963, London remained in Southeast Asia mainly because of strategic and political 
commitments. In April 1964, the British government thought: 
 
The Americans have been very helpful to us with Sukarno, but we hope 
they can do something, as they have promised in the past, to take a more 
positive line in support of Malaysia. For instance, one simple step would 
be if the Seventh (7th) Fleet carrier task force now cruising in the Indian 




The Foreign Secretary said that our costs in the defence arrangements in 
the Far East was out of proportion to the British stake in investment and 
trade in the region. Our effort was deployed less in the defence of 
British material interests than in support of the US and the 
Commonwealth partners (emphasis mine)He therefore considered 
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whether we could reduce our burden by persuading the US to associate 
themselves more closely with our defence arrangements.212.  
 
The British government knew that its financial health did not allow for a vigorous and 
far-reaching foreign policy, and knew that to a certain extent, it depended on its 
relationship with the US for its status as a world power. Britain, however, was not as 
helpless as it seemed. Londons desire for ANZUS to share its burden in Southeast Asia 
stemmed not just from merely economic weakness but also a strategic calculation of how 
best it could maximise its position in Europe, Asia and the Middle East with as little cost 
as possible. On 12 October 1964, a report wrote: 
  
We believe that politically Europe must, if largely for geographical 
reasons, remain first priority. Our economic stake there is substantial, and 
growing greaterOn the other hand, the military justification for 
maintaining forces on the present scale in Europe is likely to remain low. 
They serve essentially political ends. To meet it satisfactorily will call 
for a policy of active association with Europe, designed in particular to 
ensure close collaboration between Europe and the US. 
 
In Southeast Asia it can be argued that our military presence, however 
necessary for the time being, for both political and strategic purposes, is 
irreverent to our economic interests; it is also substantially more expensive 
than our presence in the Persian GulfBut in the Persian Gulf, although 
there are powerful political and strategic arguments for a continuing 
British presence, our main interest is likely to remain economic  a major 
stake in the oil industry, dependence on Middle Eastern oil.213   
 
The Confrontation exacerbated the cost of commitment sharply. According to Defence 
Minister Denis Healey, reporting to the House of Commons in 1965, the campaign 
against Indonesia costs £235 million214. This expenditure amounted to almost one-eighth 
of the defence budget215. Thus, when Confrontation ended, the British began expediting 
their extraction from the region. Healey opined that, The end of Confrontation by 1966 
made it politically possible for us to reduce our commitments. A year later, devaluation 
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made it economically essential216. British Foreign Secretary George Brown provided the 
context to British thinking on its role East of Suez in his memoirs. He said: 
 
The questionof the integration and unification of Europe was currently a 
very pressing problem. the need for Western Europe to be much more 
closely organised economically to provide us with the kind of domestic 
market which America and Russia have, I have always seen the question 
of European integration as not a question of extending the Common 
Market. Of course that particular act is essential in itself and will be the 
opening symbol of what I wanted to and want to do. This way we begin to 
unify this continent, getting common policies-financial, commercial, 
external and defence  so that we can stop the polarisation of the world 
around two Super-Powers. I came to the view, with my colleagues that a 
withdrawal from East of Suez and the dropping of a physical land 
presence in the Middle East was not only inevitable but essential217. 
 
Besides clearly stating that Europe was more important than Asia, Brown also hinted of 
Londons fear that it had overstayed its welcome in Southeast Asia: further imposition 
upon its former colonies weary hospitality might be detrimental218. Coming from a 
British perspective of an unpleasant decolonising experience in India, Healey recognised 
that the growth of nationalism in Southeast Asia made a prolonged British presence 
unwise219. Healy and Browns conclusion were not without reason. David Hawkins 
reflecting in 1969 on the reasons for British withdrawal stressed the complexity of this 
thorny issue by mentioning three instances when Britain felt it was no longer appreciated 
and should get out: 
 
1. Malaysia deceived Britain regarding the Separation despite Britains 
commitment to defend Malaysia, 
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2. Singapore-Malaysian public proclamations that they could expel the British or 
render the British bases ineffective by not cooperating, 
3. London faced financial threats despite the years of committing money and blood 
to Singapore-Malaysias defence220. 
 
The intended withdrawal also affected relations with the White House. Brown admitted 
that he feared the British retreat would spark off a similar US withdrawal from overseas 
commitment: starting from Vietnam and eventually NATO221. Seeking American 
understanding on Britains financial problems, Wilson explained that it was not a lack of 
will, but the means222. LBJ hinted he understood the dire straits of the British economy, 
but nonetheless felt that such a move was detrimental to US interests in Southeast Asia 
223. But in 1966, while discussing with the President on Southeast Asian security 
structure, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow told LBJ that if the British could not be 
moved, then the US should try to build up an Asian security structure without British 
participation224. In April 1967, Rostows advice to the President seemed prescient when 
the British government decided to reduce Far East forces by half by 1971. However, the 
real bombshell came in November 1967, when balance of payments problems forced the 
devaluation of the Pound. Thus, by January 1968, Britain could not longer sustain its 
forces in Southeast Asia and Wilson revealed publicly the withdrawal of British forces in 
1971225. This announcement caught Londons allies by surprised, sparking off a series of 
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unhappy exchanges, with Lee in particular. By April 1968, US officials did not regard the 
British stand on Southeast Asia favourably. Although the financial problems were 
serious, the Americans were not convinced that economics alone was to be blamed.  Rusk 
for example, was recorded to have said during the 18th ANZUS Council Meeting that 
month, The British decision to withdraw forces East of Suezwere not economic 
decisions but political decisions taken in London for internal politics and in the hope of 
improving British eligibility for the EEC.226 
 
High on the meetings agenda was the role of the British East of Suez. For Rusk to make 
this comment during this session did not reflect positively of US opinion on their ally. 
ANZUS, while sympathetic towards Britains economic problems, did not think it was 
fair that they should make-up for Londons self-interest at their expense. Despite trying to 
convince Wilson of the weight the US put on a British presence in Southeast Asia, 
Washington also anticipated the worst.227 The USNWR reported on 29 January 1968, 
Britain, long regarded as Americas strongest and most reliable ally, is to be demoted in 
importance by Washington. Britain in future is to be treated simply as just another 
European ally.228 In the Southeast Asian region, the US desired a new security 
arrangement that involved Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore as active 
participants, while Britain would participate as a non-playing captain.229  
 
Towards a Greater Australian and New Zealand Role: US Aims and Reluctance for 
Increased Participation in Southeast Asia 
 
 
By 1968, when Washington was finally convinced that the British would eventually leave 
Singapore, the US needed friends to share the responsibility of ensuring the stability of 
the Straits.   
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ACM, 5 April 1968 p. 7 and the USNWR  Vol. 64, 29 January 1968. 




On 29 May 1968, Australian Prime Minister John Gorton visited LBJ for the first time as 
leader and was accorded great honour by LBJ as a special friend and key ally of America: 
LBJ sent his personal plane for Gortons journey230. His visit was both a diplomatic call 
of a new Prime Minister to a major ally as well as to find out what was Washingtons 
stand on Southeast Asia after the British left. However, Gorton failed to meet Nixon, 
although he sincerely wanted to. Gorton, according to TA on 7 May 1968, wanted to 
confer with LBJ and preferably Nixon before his tour of Southeast Asia. After visiting 
both the US and Southeast Asia, he would be in a better position to attend the Five-Power 
Conference two weeks later in KL231. It was important for Australia to know what the 
US, Indonesia, South Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia had in mind before Canberra 
planned its move. On 8 May 1968, TAs editorial commented, 
 
The most important thing Gorton would want to know is whether the US 
feels itself able, in view of the changed nature of domestic politics and its 
present state of economic imbalance to stay the distance that de-escalation 
in Vietnam will require. He will most certainly find that the US is not 
contemplating anything like a wholesale withdrawal from Southeast Asia 
although it will certainly have altered views on conditions on which it 
should stay and the role it should play232. 
 
 
On 28 May 1968, Gorton told the Americans that Australia could not go it alone and 
wished for the US and Australia to stand together. The next day, Secretary of Defence 
Mark Clifford said to him, 
 
such support was essential in order that the President could show to 
Congress and the American public that the US was not alone. He felt 
that this symbolic support from our allies was also essential to our own 
continued involvement in Southeast Asia. it would be a serious matter if 
word got around that a power vacuum was developing in Malaysia and 
Singapore area which the US would be expected to fill. 233. 
 
Clifford claimed that the American public rejected additional US commitments to the 
Straits if its regional allies refused to take up the responsibility. Yet, at the same time, he 
                                                
230 TA, 7 May 1968. 
231 Ibid. 
232 TA, 8 May 1968. 
233 FRUS XXVII-I22926/68 Memorandum of Conversation, 29 May 1968. 
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acknowledged that the US was too deeply involved in Singapore and Malaysia already to 
simply write them off. Caught in a bind, the US wished its ANZUS allies could take up 
this responsibility for the common cause234. Collective accountability conferred a 
stronger cloak of political legitimacy i.e. collective security over self-interests235. True 
enough, on 3 June 1968, when Gorton returned home, he proclaimed in Parliament his 
confidence that the US would not leave Southeast Asia because of its enduring interest in 
the region as well as the disquiet caused by British withdrawal236. What the US needed 
was participative allies to help secure common interests in a volatile region beyond its 
reach. 
 
It was also a major foreign policy aim to aid the developing countries in Southeast Asia 
as a form of defence against Communist subversion. Strong, pro-US governments would 
in turn share the anti-Communist burden with the US237. However, newly independent 
countries like Singapore and Malaysia had reservations about being too close to the US 
orbit. Instead, Lee said that he trusted Australia and New Zealand more than the US 
because of its poor track record in dealing with Vietnamese leaders238. Yet, by 1968, 
leaders like him were realistic enough to know that the US was the only power left that 
could shield Southeast Asia from the Communist tide. 
 
Americas apparent inertia towards the Straits did not indicate a lack of interest but 
domestic, political constraint. In fact, the USNWR reported on 29 January 1968 that 
privately the US government knew that it must increase its burden in Southeast Asia 
                                                
234 FRUS-XXVII I-2296/68 Washington 29 May 1968.  See also ANZ-AAFD-811-W3138-222/1/1 Pt. 1-
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See also Statement by the President upon Signing of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 15 November 
1967. 
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Pte. Ltd. 2000) pp. 502-3. 
 58
eventually despite public disapproval 239. By deploying Australian and New Zealand 
troops in the Straits, ANZUS interests could be secured without additional US 
commitments in a region that was also sensitive to an American presence. Thus, the 
Straits presented another opportunity to convince the US by Australian and New Zealand 





























                                                
239. USNWR vol. 64 29 January 1968 and The Jakarta Times (JT) 7 January 1969. The Indonesian press 
observed that either the US took over the British bases or it needed to increase its naval presence. Either 
way, a US presence in SEA was unavoidable and necessary.  
240 In 1970, the MFA explained that New Zealands decision to remain after 1971 allowed it to practically 
demonstrate the kind of cooperation among countries of the area which the US is trying to encourage. 
The decision had raised New Zealands standing in Washington and as long as they played their part in 
Southeast Asia, the US would remain sympathetic to its needs. This put New Zealand squarely within US 
vital interests and ensured that the US had a vested interested in the well-being of its smaller partner. See 
FAR Vol. XX. New Zealands Relations with the USA  15-19 May 1970.  
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In response to Britains imminent departure, New Zealand could either leave with the 
British or stay. Leaving seemed realistic, as it could not possibly maintain a presence on 
its own although that meant abandoning New Zealands strategic interests. This was 
impossible unless New Zealand compromised the ANZUS alliance and its credibility in 
Southeast Asia. This Hobsons choice sealed the decision to remain after the British left. 
New Zealand knew that this was a responsibility that it could never shoulder alone. How 
did such a small country arrive at such a big decision?  
 
New Zealand ultimately depended on the support of its ANZUS allies to act because of 
size limitations. This calls into question the common perception that Wellingtons 1969 
decision was a truly independent action. It is important to answer this question because it 
brings clarity to the real power structure in Southeast Asia by the 1960s. This chapter 
asserts that the widening split between Britain-New Zealand acted as an impetus for an 
increasing ANZUS orientation and finally provide an understanding on where New 
Zealand really stood in the alliance. The radical split in opinion over Southeast Asia 
between these two closest of allies mirrored how the security structure in Southeast Asia 
was irrevocably changed by 1969. 
 
The Widening Schism 
 
Britains failed attempt to join the EEC in the early 1960s did not dispel the fear that 
London would put its practical needs above kinship and fidelity. British reliability was a 
major consideration in strategic planning. In April 1967, Holyoake had earlier reminded 
Brown that, It was unthinkable that Britain would not come to the help of Australia and 
New Zealand, as these two countries had gone to Britains, and again stressed the 
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importance of a continuing British presence.241 The January 1968 announcement to 
withdraw confirmed that NZs special relationship with Britain was not permanent. 
 
The public shared this disappointment and linked it to a sense of betrayal. Writing to the 
press, a member of the public said on 22 January 1968, By Britain joining the EEC, it 
proves that there is no sentiment in big business, and the bold statement by Michael 
Joseph Savage  Where Britain goes, we go has by Britains actions, outlived its 
usefulness and meaning today.242 Another letter to the press on the same day commented 
that Britains unexpected decision was one that breaks all bounds of fair play. It was 
not a fair response to a country that had sent thousands of its men to Europe at the time 
(Britains) of need243. 
 
New Zealand felt threatened in two inter-related ways. If Britain joined the EEC, New 
Zealand would lose its major trading partner in the short-term and strategic partner in an 
unstable region in the long run. A government MP said in Parliament on 2 July 1968: 
 
However, we can no longer look to Britain for the help, the protection and 
the preferred treatment we have had in the past. Britains natural desire to 
join the European Common Marketmust be rewarded sooner or later. 
The need to develop new markets as a counter to this threat is an 
additional indication and an additional example of the necessity for us to 
associate ourselves even more closely with our geographical neighbours. 
If any proof was required of the need for New Zealand to take its place as 
a significant Pacific nation, it was provided last year when Britain 
announced her decision to evacuate her forces East of Suez by 1971.244 
 
 
This quote summed up New Zealands position: it must look to Asia and the US. As a 
significant Pacific nation, New Zealand needed to keep a presence in Southeast Asia to 
protect its increasing interests before trouble broke out245. Clearly, Southeast Asian 
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problems became the deciding factor for a New Zealand response to the East of Suez 
dilemma.  
 
Differing Aims since 1966 
 
Whitehall had promised that withdrawal did not equate with dishonouring its promises in 
Southeast Asia, but to New Zealand, it was not a case of trustworthiness but ability. 
Would the British continue to be a credible deterrent in Southeast Asia? To Australia and 
New Zealand, the key to Southeast Asia defence was the Singapore base. However, the 
British, having a different focus, saw no need for a large and costly base far away from 
its area of concentration. Instead, in line with policies to reduce costs while still 
maintaining a key nuclear role in Southeast Asia and the world, London, in late January 
1966, promised to deploy Polaris submarines246. The Polaris submarines, considered the 
most important symbol of British power and commitment, were meant to reflect the 
importance England attached to Southeast Asia 247. More importantly, establishing a 
nuclear presence in Asia was Londons feeble attempt to respond to the emergence of 
Chinas nuclear status and its reverberations in Southeast Asia 248. However, Donald 
Maclean commented,  Whether Britain will for long be a participant in a Western, pre-
dominantly American, nuclear counter-force pointed at China is doubtful, despite the 
evident intention in high quarters that she should.249 
 
Moreover, Singapore, Malaysia and Australia and New Zealand were upset. To Australia 
and New Zealand, the Polaris submarines were more of a gesture than an effective 
presence because they did not agree with Britain that China posed a nuclear threat to 
Southeast Asia. Beijing, after 1966, was feared more for its subversive ideas than its 
armed forces invading Southeast Asia.  Nuclear submarines could be used to deter a 
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247 Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx p.210. The Polaris submarines were 
funded despite the financial crisis with funds that ironically could have kept the bases East of Suez. 
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military invasion, but it could not stop subversion. A military presence was more 
appropriate because troops could deter the infiltration of destabilising elements such as 
agents. Thus, New Zealand was not assured by the British proposal to deploy the lethal 
weapon because it was of no use at all. Responding to the British proposal, Holyoake said 
on 27 January 1966 that, In any event, Polaris submarines are the ultimate weapon and 
are of little assistance in the kind of situations we are experiencing in the Far East, for 
which conventional weapons are required.250  
 
There was a fundamental disagreement between Britain-New Zealand on what 
constituted a threat or deterrent, leading to disagreement on the role the Singapore base 
should play. This differing perception between Wellington and London was also 
symbolic of the US dilemma in Southeast Asia: difficulty in garnering support from 
European allies because they were too distant to concern themselves or even to 
understand Asian problems from an Asian point of view251.  
 
Thus, despite British assurances that they would still be able to fulfil its obligations in 
Southeast Asia, its allies were not convinced: The EP, on 9 January 1968 considered it 
unfortunate that Britain was embarking on this course of action despite the uncertainty 
posed by Vietnam over Southeast Asia252. During the 1968 January talks between 
Holyoake and the British Minister of Commonwealth Affairs, George Thomson, the 
Prime Minister said that while New Zealand was grateful to the British for their 
assurances, he expressed special concern that there would be no British military 
capability earmarked for the Far East after withdrawal.253 The EP on 11 January 1968 
reported that London tried to assure Wellington that it would not forget its moral 
obligation to New Zealand and had the capability to make a quick return should the need 
arise254. The same day of the EP report, Singapores Lee asked Thomson that with the 
drastic cuts in the air force, navy and a 60 000 men cut in the army, how could London 
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not realise it had effectively turned their backs to Southeast Asia.255 Singapore, 
Malaysia, Australia and the US were cynical too. Even Washington doubted Londons 
ability to project forces in times of need. On 29 January 1968, the USNWR pointed out 
that the de-commissioning of British aircraft carriers, cancelling the orders for the long-
range F-111s and an obsolete submarine nuclear force did not instil confidence in its 
allies in Southeast Asia even if Britain wanted to fulfil its obligations256. With what 
would Britain project its power? 
 
Then on 8 February 1968, a document from the New Zealand Department of External 
Affairs to the Prime Minister opined that: 
 
By the end of 1971, the British military presence in Malaysia and 
Singapore would have disappeared. It is doubtful whether Britain will be 
able to make an effective military contribution outside Europe after that 
date even if it had the will. British support for SEATO and Malaysia and 
Singapore will lose its credibility.257  
 
 
On 17 February 1968, Millar summed up the British position succinctly, The British 
want a good name here, they want to wrap things up fairly before they go, but they do not 
want responsibility-and responsibility is what you have in an alliance.258 Tun Razak, 
Malaysias Deputy Prime Minister added in early March 1968 : 
 
She (Britain) has made it clear that she has to withdraw and I think after 
the end of 1971, we cant count on Britain very much...perhaps she will be 
able to help economically and with the expansion of defences forces, but 
she is in economic difficulty, and I dont see how she can help very 
much.259 
 
From the beginning in January 1968, Holyoake had already made it clear that he held 
British actions responsible for the split. He told Thomson: 
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New Zealand had had a comfortable existence 12000 miles from Britain 
but closely linked. Until WWII we had hardly known that Southeast Asia 
existed. Since that time we had switched our defence commitments from 
Europe and the Middle East to Southeast Asia. but there was a growing 
consciousness among New Zealanders of a Pacific and Southeast Asian 
future. These successive shocks made us conscious of Britains position 
in the world and our own and we have to find a way of coping with these 
changing circumstances.260 
 
Strategically and economically, Holyoake was disillusioned. Laking said his premier was 
also upset because New Zealand efforts to secure trade privileges were stymied because 
of Britains entry application to the EEC.261 Faced with tough defence and economic 
choices, New Zealand realised that it was every man for himself and Britain was no 
different. Despite British assurances, New Zealand, by early 1968, instead identified 
more closely with its neighbours in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Defence policies were 
the best litmus test because it required a presence: deployment represented genuine 
interests. Therefore, Britain was perceived to be unconcerned with Southeast Asia 
problems while Australia and New Zealand was. Wellington understood the financial 
problems Britain faced but was clearly disappointed. Despite feeling resentful, cooler 
heads had prevailed and stressed the need to start making independent decisions and re-
evaluating strategic partners. For example, the EP editorial of 18 January 1968 titled 
Twilight of an Empire concluded that: 
 
The urgent need of the moment is to re-survey the Pacific defence set-up 
and to construct, if possible, a firmer, more effective partnership with 
those nations whose defence interests coincide roughly with our own.262 
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Hints of diminishing reliance on Britain could be discerned from the fact that when, in 
late February 1968, pressed by the Tunku on the 5 power talks, New Zealand tarried on 
confirming the dates because it needed to concert its thinking with ANZUS before 
speaking to other concerned parties like the British and the Southeast Asian leaders.263 
ANZUS started to replace the British as the foundation of New Zealands Straits defence 
strategy. On 18 July 1968, A New Zealand MP concluded in Parliament that: 
 
The British government speaks as if it has the ability to deploy troops 
readily in the area if an emergency occurs. That is a helpful statement, but 
how effectively that can be done remains to be seen. So, while the 
assurances we have received are important I do not think that we can 
wholly rely on them for our protection.264 
 
New Zealand Interests in Southeast Asia 
 
Southeast Asia was slowly, and deemed surely to grow to become one of New Zealands 
key trading partners. Although by 1968, New Zealand was convinced that no external, 
direct threat endangered Southeast Asia, an internally unstable Southeast Asia could 
hamper future economic development, and also block the vital air and sea-lanes that 
coursed through the region along the way to Europe265.  
 
New Zealand was operating in a region that basically desired a strong but inconspicuous 
US presence in Southeast Asia and this coincided with Wellingtons agenda266. The 
uncertainty after Tet added to the problems created by the British withdrawal. A crisis in 
Vietnam could undo the stability in Southeast Asia, even if there was an Australian and 
New Zealand presence in the straits267. Comparing statements made in 1965 and 1968: 
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New Zealand government officials said in 1965 that: 
 
The New Zealand government holds the view that the defence of 
Malaysia constitutes the first priority within NZs defence 
commitments and obligations to SEA. (emphasis mine) We accept, 
however that strategically Vietnam is the crucial struggle and that what 
happens in Malaysia may depend to a large extent on what happens in 
Vietnam.268  
 
However, in 1968, after Confrontation, the focus changed and Vietnam became the 
immediate priority. On 8 February 1968, a document from the Department of External 
Affairs to Prime Minister said that: 
 
In terms both of our relations with the US, the ultimate guarantor of our 
own security and of the security situation in Southeast Asia, our defence 
contribution in Vietnam is now more important than our military 
presence in Malaysia and Singapore although that presence still has 
strategic and political value.269 (emphasis mine) 
 
 
Similarly, the Australians considered that their forces in Vietnam are envisaged as their 
primary contribution to Southeast Asia defence.270 Australia and New Zealand increased 
troop strength in Vietnam after Confrontation in order to face the perceived threat from 
the North. Australia increased its troops from one battalion in 1965 to almost 7000 men 
by 1968, half of which were conscripts271. New Zealand sent a battery in 1965, since it 
already had 1300 men in Malaysia out of a meagre armed force of 5374 troops272. This 
force was eventually enlarged to about 550 men after Confrontation, roughly 10% of its 
total forces. The impact of Vietnam on Australian and New Zealand thinking was 
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significant: the British decision in January 1968 was very much only a catalyst to an 
already volatile and insecure situation273.  
 
By 1968, recognising that Vietnam could possibly decide the future of Southeast Asia, 
Australian and New Zealand foreign policy swung towards the US274. New Zealand could 
not undertake a deployment in the Straits without Australia and vice-versa, and both 
would not do it without US acquiescence. An article in The EP, in June 1968, argued 
persuasively for an Australian and New Zealand decision to remain in the Straits but tied 
it ultimately to the US. Moreover, the Straits countries welcomed Australia and New 
Zealand but not the US.275 The US presence was however, precarious and uncertain 
because of the impact of the Vietnam War on US foreign policy. Australia and New 
Zealand had to ensure that the ANZUS treaty applied in the Straits because it was there 
that Australia and New Zealand interests were threatened. This meant that it would have 
to stand in where the over-taxed US could not. 
 
The Decision-making at Home 
 
This divergence of national interests between Britain and New Zealand could not be 
expressed clearer from this telegram from Holyoake to Wilson on 7 July 1967: 
 
It is the British military presence in SEA which makes the Commonwealth 
military presence credible. I am concerned that the departure of the British 
forces will render the possibility of our continued presence doubtfulnot 
only from a purely practical point of view, but also because of a lack of 
military and hence political credibility.276 
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Without political credibility, New Zealand could not justify its presence in Southeast 
Asia because its troops had always been a result of Wellingtons association with 
AMDA277. New Zealand interests were increasingly extrinsic to British concerns and 
without Britain as a justifying factor, it would be politically and legally inconvenient to 
stay. In other words, the British association was a political cloak as well as a convenient 
military support system to secure New Zealand strategic interests.  
 
By 1968, the decision was clear. Holyoake said to the press on 12 January 1968, New 
Zealand would maintain its own forces in Malaysia and Singapore although Mr. 
Thomson had not asked New Zealand to either maintain its existing forces in Southeast 
Asia after the British withdrawal or to increase its commitments.278 New Zealand vital 
interests in Southeast Asia must be secured regardless whether the British stayed or not. 
On 18 January 1968, Opposition leader Norman Kirk said that New Zealand should take 
the initiative to work out some arrangements with the local governments of Southeast 
Asia to fill the vacuum left by the British because this was a matter of great concern to 
New Zealand regardless of US and British interests279. He said that the British withdrawal 
led to a decreased in collective security that New Zealand depended on, thus, New 
Zealand should seek greater collaboration in Southeast Asia280. Kirk added that the 
Southeast Asia countries could provide manpower, but in terms of resource and 
equipment, they were not ready to stand on their own281.  On 17 July 1968, supporting the 
governments decision to remain in Singapore, an Opposition member in Parliament said, 
This is not the time for us to suddenly call all our troops back from Malaysia.282 
Despite debating philosophical aspects of New Zealands foreign policy and relationship 
with the US, the common sentiment in parliament was for New Zealand to remain.  
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Increasingly Southeast Asian, Increasingly ANZUS 
 
Being the smallest in ANZUS, it was only natural that New Zealand would need to act in 
tandem with its allies. A memorandum of the discussions between Canberra and 
Wellington from the Defence Ministry to the Cabinet in August 1967 stressed the 
importance of Southeast Asia and ANZUS: 
 
  .any major threat is likely to develop through Southeast Asia; that 
there is an active Communist threat to the security and stability of 
Southeast Asia; and that New Zealands own long-term security which 
must depend on our collective defence arrangements can best be assured 
by contributing small forces under the command of a major ally in the area 
where they are most needed and where our strategic interests lie. The 
Malaysia/Singapore area has been the focal point for this policy.283 
 
Establishing the importance of Singapore and Malaysia to its defence plans, the 
document outlined the adjustments to factor in the Australians and the US rather than the 
British. It continued: 
 
Our only hope of maintaining a military presence in the area is in 
association with Australia. Even after some understanding has been 
reached between Australia and New Zealand we shall still need to find 
out the attitude of the US in the longer term. With the withdrawal of the 
British, the US will become the only major western power left in 
Southeast Asia, and will be even more concerned for the security of 
Malaysia and Singapore. It must however start to take a greater interest 
in the security of its southern flank, and it will not be lost on the US that 
Malaysia/Singapore is an area where ANZAC can make a special 
contribution.284 
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The fear of an American withdrawal from Southeast Asia was not groundless285. Even 
though New Zealand sent troops to Vietnam in 1965, LBJ reminded New Zealand again 
of the importance of regional support for the US in Vietnam. When he visited Wellington 
on 20 October 1966, he said: 
 
If the people directly concerned did not consider this important, the US for 
its part could, of course, save much blood and dollars. The US could 
pull out its forces and return home. The area of conflict was much closer 
to this part of the world than to the US. But this would leave the area at the 
mercy of the aggressors. It depended on what the people in the area 
wanted. It was therefore most important for New Zealand and the 
countries close to it to show their own direct interest and concern to 
protect their own liberty and freedom.286 
 
Although he had always affirmed his appreciation towards his ANZUS allies for their 
support in Vietnam, his reminder underscored clearly that the Americans needed more 
than what was already given. He explained in The Vantage Point that the purpose of his 
trip to Canberra and Wellington in 1966 was to stress that the future of Asia depended 
on Asian cooperation, which we were ready and eager to support.287  
 
However, one of Australias and New Zealands greatest fears was whether the British 
withdrawal would discourage the US. In mid-1967,  Holyoake expressed his worry in a 
telegram to Wilson : 
 
A British decision to leave the Southeast Asian mainland, taken while the 
end of the struggle (Vietnam) is still not in sight, could only strengthen the 
hand of those in the US who wish to get out of Asia, whatever the cost. A 
withdrawal of both British and American forces would have the gravest 
implications for the future security of Australia and New Zealand.288 
 
                                                
285LBJ and subsequently Nixon were under great pressure to reduce US commitments in Southeast Asia. 
Thus, England was worried that extreme isolationism might force the US to withdraw from Europe. Thus, 
although Britain wanted to withdraw from SEA, it tried its best to offer political support to the Americans 
in Vietnam. See Brown, In My Way pp.141-2 and USNWR, Vol. 64 16 December 1968. 
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287 Johnson, The Vantage Point p. 360. 
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The fear of a US withdrawal intensified when LBJ announced in early 1968 his plan to 
scale back on US Vietnam commitments and his decision against re-election. Besides the 
ANZUS treaty, both Holt and Holyoake had strong ties and similar views on security as 
LBJ. Nixon was not perceived to be as forthright in granting help to Southeast Asia as his 
predecessor289. He believed the US should take a backseat to those who had a direct 
interest, allowing them to do the fighting, supported only with US arms and money290. 
The timing of the announcement could not be more unfortunate: Britain announced its 
decision in January and LBJ in March 1968. New Zealand was primarily worried that a 
new US president would not be favourable with trade terms. Wellington was not as 
concerned about defence ties because geographical realities could not change with a new 
president: a complete US strategic withdrawal from Southeast Asia was unlikely291. 
However, what New Zealand feared was the impact of public perception on Nixons 
commitment to Southeast Asia. The USNWR reported in December 1968 that the 
perception that allies were not contributing enough had a negative impact on the 
American public on how far the US should go292. This uncertainty over the extent of 
future American commitment in Southeast Asia made it important for Australia and New 
Zealand to have a say in regional developments293. 
 
 Besides defence matters, there was an increasing dependency on American and Asian 
trade because of the EEC294. Southeast Asian economies in the 1960s were infants and 
would take some time to mature into major trading partners. New Zealands participation 
in the region through its aid programs and deployments were to ensure the steady 
development of Southeast Asian economies: turning them from dependencies to future 
trading partners in replacement of the British market. However, that was still in the future 
and in the 1960s, New Zealand needed the Americans295. LBJ balanced the importance of 
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Wellingtons contribution to Washingtons Southeast Asian policy with adjusting the 
trade between the US and New Zealand to allow for more diary exports to the US296. 
Washington recognised that for Wellington to play a bigger defence role in Southeast 
Asia, it needed equipment that had to be imported with cash297. By 1968, the US had 
become the second largest customer of New Zealand products298.  For example, that year 
the US agreed to increase lamb purchases and procure supplies and equipment for 
operations in the Antarctic.299 
 
In the October 1968 talks with the US, New Zealand ambassador Frank H. Corner argued 
that the destiny of the two countries were linked, and economic support for New Zealand 
will strengthen the alliance. Significantly, he wished that Washington would establish the 
degree of closeness that Britain had with Australia and New Zealand. The Americans 
recorded that, (Corner) alluded to New Zealands traditional economic/political 
relationship with the US in the old Commonwealth(emphasis mine) as an example of 
the kind of alliance the US should now forge with New Zealand300  
 
To refer to the Commonwealth as old while the relationship was still in existence 
suggested that it was obsolete. Even before the British actually withdrew, New Zealand 
was already looking to the US for its economic/strategic security. New Zealand thus 
found itself in a unique position. It could emplace a presence where the US could not. 
However, Wellington had to consider whether Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia 
welcomed them and would the US support them in the event of a conflict. 
 
New Zealand newspaper commentators believed that the US, having invested too much, 
would not leave Southeast Asia. Closer to home, there was no doubt that Singapore and 
Malaysia welcomed an Australian and New Zealand presence because it was a good 
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stabiliser when the British departed. However, the thorny issue revolved around Asian 
sensitivity to American presence. The Straits countries outwardly disapproved of a US 
presence, but were quietly aware of the necessity of accommodating Washington. For 
political reasons, Singapore and Malaysia did not wish to be publicly identified with the 
US301. For instance, Lee offered two very different perspectives of the US presence in 
Southeast Asia to two different audiences in his response to the eventual British 
withdrawal. 
 
On 17 October 1967, when he visited the US, he hinted to LBJ at the importance of the 
US to an ominous world that was endangered by the presence of bears and dragons302. 
There was no doubt he wanted to remind the Americans that they played a crucial role 
against Communism in Southeast Asia. Lee stressed this point further on 5 November 
1967 in a speech that he worried for the younger generation of Americans who might not 
be willing to support Singapore in the future due to a lack of understanding in Asian 
affairs303. The same day, he told reporters that he was afraid the US would turn its back 
on Asia, thinking that the region is not worth defending304. Summarising his thoughts, he 
told both international and local reporters he, wants to know from the Americans 
whether they believe that Singapore has a right to survive as a nation, as a people.305 
Why was this speech not delivered to the British, Australians and New Zealanders but the 
American people? Surely it must be because US interest in Southeast Asia was critical for 
Singapores survival. 
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However, to The Straits Times (ST) in March 1968, he said,  If you want any insurgency 
problems in Singapore and peninsular Malaysia, one of the surest ways of having a 
catalyst thrown in that direction is to have an American garrison.306 Instead, he hoped 
Australia would continue with its presence and cooperation in Southeast Asia.307 With 
the British announcement, the urgency to secure Australia and New Zealand assurances 
became more urgent even though he did not want a direct US presence. This, however, 
did not mean that he did not appreciate the value of an American interest in Southeast 
Asia. 
 
Lees true intentions could be seen most clearly from the fact that in 1966 he agreed to 
host US troops on rest and recreation from Vietnam. According to him, it was 
Singapores quiet way of showing support for Americas effort in Vietnam.308 The 
move to support the US must be understood in line with Lees stand since independence 
that while non-alignment was preferred, he was not neutral when it came to Singapores 
freedom and survival309. A US military base was too conspicuous, thus he wished for a 
US naval base in Singapore that was less blatant i.e. administered by Australia and New 
Zealand, used by the Americans310. Singapore made overtures via the Australians quietly 
for this purpose. Moreover, the US State Department was confident that Lee, despite 
being difficult and having an inflated view of his position vis-à-vis the Americans, 
wanted sound relations with Washington for practical reasons311.  
 
Kuala Lumpur (KL) knew from its experience fighting the Malayan Emergency and 
Confrontation the importance of the US. Malaysia was strongly encouraged by Americas 
stand in Vietnam as well as its support for Malaysia during Confrontation, even though 
initially the US thought Indonesia made a more crucial ally. Instead, it found Malaysia 
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more in line with its policies for Southeast Asia312. Donald Weatherbee observed in 1964, 
Indonesian efforts to destroy Malaysia are not conducive to regional stability and 
strength. American policy should be based on its own regional interest and not the fickle 
friendship of Indonesia.313 
 
Tunku, like Lee, publicly declared that Malaysias foreign policy was not neutral: it 
leaned towards Australia, New Zealand, Britain and the US314. Like Singapore, Malaysia 
adopted a non-aligned stance that was conditional upon its national interests. This 
resulted in what could be seen as a form of conditional alignment.  Tunku was aware 
that an American presence made a world of difference in a dangerous international 
environment. Invited to the White House on 22 July 1964, he said: 
I come from an area of the world that is beset with all kinds of troubles. 
To the north to the east there is trouble, and now there is trouble coming 
from the south of my country. These troubles threaten to encircle the two 
countries in southeast Asia that have so far remained free. 
To us small nations, America forever stands out as a pillar of hope, a 
guarantor of our rights as free nations.315 (emphasis mine)  
 
During Ghazalis meeting with US ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman the next day, 
the American suggested that since KL was  as firmly interested in keeping Communist 
power from dominating the area, we and Malaysia should be in close and regular touch 
about developments in Southeast Asia, even if they did not always agree316. According 
to Ghazali Shafie, Malaysias approach to foreign policy was formulated by its own 
experiences with ideological struggles. These experiences determined by whose side 
Malaysia stood317.  
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To look to the US while Britain was defending Malaysia in 1964 during Confrontation 
would not have made the British look good. Was this a sign that KL knew that winds of 
change were approaching and adopted a pragmatic approach to secure its own future? 
This was not lost on the Americans. Washington, by December 1965, believed 
that,Malaysia will almost certainly continue to give diplomatic support to US military 
initiatives in Southeast Asia, if only to ensure US military assistance for itself in a time of 
real need.318 
 
Tunku further reinforced the Americans belief in July 1966: 
 
If we enter into friendly ties with Communist countries they would work 
hard to destroy us. The main reason for making friends with non-
Communist countries is because conditions in this country are congenial to 
it. We gain both in matters of defence and economy.319 
 
The anti-Communist stance helped secure US aid and became the foundation of the 
relationship between KL and the Washington320. On 4 October 1966, Razak visited 
Washington and requested for greater aid. His appeal was favourably received. Just 
before LBJ visited Malaysia in mid October 1966, Rusk said to him on 15 October 1966: 
 
Although Malaysia does not contribute to the collective security of South 
Vietnamyou are visiting KLbecause we wish to lend friendly support 
to this democratic country, which is recovering well from a severe dose of 
Communist guerrilla warfare.321 
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Although there were disagreements between the US and Malaysia over economic issues, 
extent of military aid and the role of Indonesia, nonetheless, ties were good because of 
common goals. Rene Peritz summed up by 1967: 
 
 The prevalent US view of the Federation of Malaysia sees it as a prime 
and inspiring example of a nation that has defeated a Communist insurgent 
force after an extended period of conflict, and has accomplished this with 
the assistance of a western country. The Federation today, in official US 
eyes, bears many of the marks of a functioning democracy... there is no 
conflict of essential interests between the two peoples.322 
 
Judging from Rusks words and Peritzs comments, mutual interests far outweighed 
formal alliances and trade disagreements. Even though KL had no treaty with the US, 
Washington offered support on the basis of Malaysia being a democratic nation and 
recovering from a large dose of Communist guerrilla war. These two virtues, 
convinced Washington that it had found a bona fide ally323. 
 
 Such a practical approach to foreign policy was helpful: Singapore and Malaysia 
recognised that the US was fundamental to Australia and New Zealands contribution to 
the Straits, which made it easier to accept and politically easier to defend. Commenting 
on Australia and New Zealand s February 1969 decision, Ghazali said to New Zealand 
officials on 6 November 1969 that Australia and New Zealand made an independent 
decision on Malaysia and Singapore without great power involvement324. He said, 
 
In Malaysia and SingaporeAustralia and New Zealand had been 
involved for a long time and for their own independent and entirely valid 
reasons. These reasonscentred on our interest in preserving stability and 
security in the region, gave a legitimate basis for partnership with 
Malaysia and Singapore325. 
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While it was unknown whether Ghazali actually knew the extent Australia and New 
Zealand depended on US assurances before it took the plunge, it could be assumed that 
he had some inkling that Australia and New Zealand would not have done so without 
Washingtons assurance since Canberra and Wellington never hid the fact that they could 
not undertake a role in the region without great power help326. The fact that there was no 
reference to US support for Australia and New Zealand hinted that America, while 
needed, was kept at a comfortable and discreet distance. 
 
The Indonesians also warranted careful consideration. Previously considered a threat, 
Indonesia, by 1968, was in fact more aligned with Australian and New Zealand goals for 
Southeast Asia than was assumed possible. Australia and the US appreciated this change 
in Indonesia. On 9 February 1968, Holyaoke instructed his Defence Minister to 
reciprocate, You will be aware that the Australians have been strikingly ready to 
concede Indonesias interests in any future security arrangements which Australia might 
enter into in Southeast Asia. I see no reason why we should not be prepared to do the 
same.327  Not only did Jakarta welcome an Australian and New Zealand presence, it also 
wanted stronger ties with its former foes. For example, Indonesian officials said on 17 
February 1968 they wanted increased personal contact between the governments328. 
Significantly, in April 1968, when Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik visited New 
Zealand, he told New Zealand leaders that Jakarta could accept a continuing Australian 
and New Zealand presence but would not accept any additional powers329.   
 
Fearing Chinese subversion, Indonesia had a change of heart towards ANZUS330. 
Indonesia also approached the US formally for reconstruction aid331. This was an attempt 
to reconcile with the US, as aid was given only to countries that were friendly to 
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American interests. Under Suharto, Indonesia was more aligned with the aims of the 
western countries, and more importantly, the US perceived him as a possible long-term 
ally in Southeast Asia that Washington could cultivate332. Also, with the formation of 
ASEAN in 1967, Indonesia was no longer a pariah but an important co-player in the 
quest for regional stability333. This was an inescapable position for antipodean 
international relations because Indonesia is the largest of the Straits countries. Without its 
acquiescence, stability in the straits was unachievable, as Confrontation demonstrated. 
Thus, Suhartos openness towards Australia and New Zealand participation in 1968 in the 
Straits was an extremely welcomed development in the decision-making process for New 
Zealand.  
 
Suhartos response answered the important question of whether there was opposition to 
New Zealands deployment, since the only unpredictable element with a recent history of 
antagonism was Indonesia. If New Zealand was welcomed into the region as a 
neighbour, New Zealand increase its advantage by aiding Indonesias development as 
an insurance against future hostility334. Helping in the re-development of the country 
would give Wellington a voice in shaping the role Indonesia should play in the region, 
thus moderating any future conflict with ANZUS. The cost of ensuring stability while 
there was still peace would be lesser than if instability returned. 
 
 The fact that Wellingtons presence did not stir any anti-western or colonial sensitivity 
was a powerful argument to convince Washington to support Australia and New Zealand 
in Southeast Asia.  
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Persuading the Strong-The US 
 
US foreign policy regarding the region, amidst the great uncertainty in Vietnam and the 
elections in US, was still indeterminate. There was apprehension among both the 
populace and the Opposition that nothing Wellington did could enlist American 
assistance unless New Zealand was in the US sphere of interests. Arguing in Parliament 
that insignificant Wellington needed to depend on collective efforts with ANZUS now 
that Britain was leaving, the government believed that remaining in the Straits was the 
best option it could choose. Though it seemed to be playing to American interests, the 
government insisted that it was not. In asserting that New Zealands decision to stay in 
1968 was one made for New Zealands benefit, a MP said in Parliament that same year: 
 
In my view there is no other course open to us but to follow a policy of 
supporting the major western democracies within the limitsof an 
independent nation. We make our own independent assessments of the 
situation, and we follow according to the dictates of our own conscience in 
the circumstanceswe must rely on mutual security arrangements, but we 
cannot expect to enter into these arrangements with people who are strong 
enough to help us unless we are prepared to give back something in 
return. We accept as part of our overall responsibility that there is a 
need for New Zealand, a small country of ours to play a part in the 
political and economic stability of the Southeast Asia and South Pacific 
area. I think in this way small nations like New Zealand and Australia 
can play a significant role and probably be more acceptable to these 
people than perhaps larger nations like the US335. 
 
Corner, reinforcing this message, said to an American audience in 1968 regarding the 
ability to resist Communism that Southeast Asia: 
 
depend on some backing from outside their immediate region. At 
present only the US, Australia and New Zealand can provide that backing. 
There are certain objections, domestic and international, to the US acting 
alone. It is inconceivable, even suicidal, for Australia and New Zealand to 
act without the US. Australia and New Zealand  have much to offer; we 
are not feared and in most cases welcomes. But our future in Asia, New 
Zealands at any rate-indeed New Zealands capacity to play any 
                                                
335NZH 17 July 1968 pp. 567-8. 
 81
significant part at all-depends greatly on the way its relationship with the 
US is permitted to develop336.  
 
The US policy of having participative allies would not change even when LBJ was 
replaced. Blending New Zealand roles in Southeast Asia within the American umbrella 
was killing two birds with one stone.  
 
Conclusion-The Spirit is Willing, but the Flesh is Weak 
 
For New Zealand, physical size hampered its decision to remain in Southeast Asia. 
Despite its limits, Wellington was prepared to accept an increase in its commitments and 
expenditures337. Still, the ball was in Australias court. The EP reported in January 1968 
that, This countrys moves will be guided by what Australia plans to do. 338 
 
However, Australia seemed more hesitant than New Zealand about its new role in 
Southeast Asia. For instance, while the NZLP and press affirmed governments 
decisiveness to stay, the Australian press and the opposition party criticised Gorton for 
dragging its feet339. Regardless of how Wellington felt, any action in Southeast Asia 
ultimately hinged on Australian and New Zealand teamwork340. 
 
Canberras hesitation could be linked to its greater proximity, and hence increased 
likelihood of being drawn into the potential conflicts of the region. Thus, Australia 
needed greater assurance from the US.341 New Zealand, not in a position to make any 
major decisions for the alliance, could only hope to persuade its partners through its 
willingness to remain. 
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The era of depending on Britains lead was clearly over. Instead, ANZUS and Southeast 
Asian opinions mattered more. New Zealand announced to the great relief of Southeast 
Asia on 25 February 1969 of its decision, only after an anxiously awaited decision from 
its neighbour. For New Zealand, The Economist concluded that, New Zealand is only 
too conscious of being tucked away in an isolated corner of the South-west Pacific. As 
Britain withdraws to the other side of the world, it feels more acutely the need for friends 
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Chapter 4.2: Australia and the British Withdrawal from the Straits of Malacca 
1966-69 
 
The British withdrawal forced Canberra to acknowledge that it would always be 
connected to Southeast Asia and not Britain:  it should seek to influence regional affairs. 
Like New Zealand, Australia had to make the tough decision whether to become the only 
western garrisons left in the Straits. Australia had never operated in Southeast Asia 
without the support of a major power, therefore this responsibility would increase its 
burden considerably. What prompted Australia to do so, and what were the benefits? 
 
In January 1966, regarding the British, the Australians said: 
 
There seems to be an underlying British thought that the phasing out or 
withdrawal from Singapore could assist the process of reaching an 
understanding with the Indonesians. We would disagree. (emphasis mine) 
 We would say that the presence of British power is essential to provide a 
local balance vis-à-vis Indonesia.343  
 
Why would Australia, a close ally of Britain, disagree so strongly? With the war raging in 
Vietnam, a British retreat was bad for morale. In January 1966, analysing its response to 
impending British withdrawal, Canberra felt that: 
 
At a time when the American and other countries are heavily engaged in 
Vietnam when Laos and Thailand are acutely conscious of threat, a 
British military cut-back  in Southeast Asia would have a bad effect on 
morale. The ending of Confrontation cannot be regarded as the 
determining issue for the British and in any event what happens in 
Vietnam would have a big effect on how Indonesia behaves. Our concept 
of forward defence rests also on the fact that Singapore and Malaysia 
are politically stablewe believe that the bases-and the ANZUK 
presence have contributed greatly to the political stability of the 
regionthe weakening or disappearance of this presence could bring 
unrest, uncertainty and new orientations.344 
 
However, British views on the Singapore base since 1964 were: 
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Singapore is nowadays only one link in a chain of many.... the only sure 
means of militarily communication with Australia in an emergency will be 
the west-about route via America instead of east-about via Singapore. in 
establishing Malaysia in order to provide for the right political 
environment for our strategic deployment in the area, we have in fact 
created a situation in which our strategy is largely nullified by the need to 
use most of our available forces to defend Malaysia. In the long run, our 
interests will be best served by a political settlement between Malaysia 
and Indonesia. but in some circumstances it might be incompatible with 
our continued tenure of the Singapore base. British standing has long been 
associated with the existence of a large British base in Singapore. If this 
was given up, countries in the area might revise their policy towards us, 
although they would be less likely to do so if alternative facilities were 




Britain thought its presence was the fundamental cause of anti-western sentiments in 
Indonesia and thus, the military solution to Confrontation was only a short-term solution. 
However, Australia disagreed. It felt that future Indonesian mischief in the absence of the 
British would threaten Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand interests in the 
Straits. Why the difference in perception? A letter from the Australian Department of 
Defence to the Department of External Affairs in January 1968 concluded that it was a 
matter of geography, The third factor is that within the UK there is a great tendency to 
look upon the Far East as a remote locality which is in sharp contrast to our view point 
which is conditioned by the fact of it being on our back door.346 
 
However, Britains withdrawal plans upset senior US officials like LBJ, Rusk and 
McNamara: they communicated to Wilsons cabinet that the US considered Southeast 
Asia more crucial and therefore more in need of British support than Europe. Rusk 
expressed his displeasure when he asked Healey in the late 1960s, What if the American 
reaction to an act of aggression under NATO protection was the same as the British 
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Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (D)(0)(64)59). 22 September 1964. 
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reaction under SEATO?347 ANZUS shared the belief that only a major international 
crisis or a change in economic status would change Britains stand. However, it summed 
up the British as being neither scared nor rich348. Britains obduracy angered the US 
and disappointed Australia and New Zealand 349. However, London had its own agenda 
and how it would uphold its agreement to contribute to Australias defence without 
incurring too much expense. 
 
Mismatched Expectations: A Base in Australia? 
 
Preplanning for the withdrawal from Singapore, Britain raised the possibility that 
Australia might become the site of the next British base because of shared costs with the 
Australians and proximity to Southeast Asia: London commissioned a visit to study the 
viability of a base in Australia in 1966. Whitehall was expecting a base that could service 
its nuclear forces as well as to based troops transferred from Singapore and Malaysia350. 
Anticipating the Australians to welcome a base on their soil, the British were 
unpleasantly surprised when they were turned down. Bell wrote in Dependent Ally,  
Denis Healey as defence secretary visited Australia in January 1966 to canvass options, 
and later said, We held out our hand, and if the Australians had any sense, could have 
nailed it. But they didnt.351 Healey recalled that the Australians came out with excuses 
such as lacking constructions workers:  he thought that it was obvious Australia did not 
want the British to leave Singapore352. 
 
Healeys words revealed how London had miscalculated that Australian and British 
concerns were similar, and this incident, like the Polaris submarine affair in January 1966 
in Wellington, highlighted the widening gap within Australia, New Zealand and Britain 
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as early as 1966. Both the Australians and the Americans resisted the plan because 
ANZUS interests were best protected if the British remained in Singapore. Thus, any 
move to reduce costs for Whitehall as suggested in the plan for Fortress Australia was 
discouraged to prevent giving the British an incentive to speed up its withdrawal353. 
Singapore was also a lot closer to Indo-China. Therefore, hypothetical British forces 
based so far away from the theatre were criticised by Rusk to be quite irrelevant to 
what was going on354. The Australian government agreed, The most obvious objection 
to using Australian base facilities would be that the movement of British forces to 
Southeast Asia might take almost as long as it would from the United Kingdom.355 
 
There were also domestic political problems if 5000 Australian troops were fighting in 
Vietnam while 5000 British troops were based safely in Australia356. The Australian 
public would never allow their conscripts to be away fighting what they would then 
perceived as someone elses fight. If the citizenry opposed the deployment on the 
grounds that it should not carry a burden the British deemed unnecessary, the ANZUS 
alliance, and by default Australian security, would be severely compromised. There were, 
however some advantages to hosting the British base like British nuclear protection. 
However, Australia was more concerned with stalling Communist subversion at its 
doorstep than a nuclear exchange357.  Having a British base in Australia would not help in 
that end at all.  
 
The proposed Australian base and its subsequent rejection was a clear indication that 
Australia and Britain disagreed over Southeast Asia. Britain wanted a commitment that 
cost as little as possible, while allowing it to keep its status as a major nuclear power, but 
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Australia needed a British undertaking that was closer to where the action was and 
therefore more costly358.  
 
By August 1967, the chasm between the British and Australians was wide enough for the 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (FAD) in Canberra, in planning for an increased 
role in Southeast Asia to conclude that the US alliance was crucial to Australian security 
and US support was necessary for whatever (Emphasis mine) strategy Australia decided 
upon359.  
 
 Still, Britains announcement of January 1968 caught the Australians by surprise because 
Canberra had prepared its defence assessments based on Londons prior projections in the 
July 1967 White Paper to maintain forces in the region until the mid-1970s360. Wilson 
said in Parliament, 
 
It is not only at home in these past years that we have been living beyond 
our means. Our real influence and power for peace will be strengthened by 
realistic priorities.We have assured them both (Singapore and Malaysia) 
and our Commonwealth allies that we shall retain general capabilities 
based in Europe and of course, the UK.We are determined that our 
commitments and our capacity of our forces to undertake them should 
match and balance each other. The decision would entail major changes in 
the role, size and shape of our forces and the nature and scale of the 
equipment that would be required and in the support facilities which were 
necessary361. 
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Britains promise to deploy forces from Europe in a crisis and the presence of a naval 
force could not deter subversion362. Moreover, since the ability to contribute to Southeast 
Asia was subjected to conditions in Europe, the promise to help in times of need could 
not in reality pledge anything concrete363. Even as early as October 1964, the British 
government already realized that it could not take on such a major role. A government 
report reflected, 
 
It is sometimes forgotten that Britains present world role and world-
wide commitments are largely a historical reflection of this situation. The 
political and military power built up by this nation has been intimately 
related to its economic requirements. Can Britain earn enough abroad to 
maintain world-wide commitments whether on the present or on a 
substantially reduced scale364? 
 
By 1968, after the 1967 devaluations, Wilsons pledged to ensure that there would be 
sufficient forces to intervene in Southeast Asia was nothing more than a bold claim 
masking Britains true goals of putting Europe before Asia. Also, taking into context the 
whole direction of British foreign policy to prioritise Europe, it seemed probable that the 
British did not have the financial means or the will to carry out their promise. Sensing 
Londons position, the TA reported on 15 January 1968 that, Australian defence planners 
this week will begin working on security arrangements which will, for the first time, not 
include British forces in Southeast Asia. Canberra is now convinced that no British forces 
will stay anywhere in Southeast Asia after the general withdrawal from Singapore and 
Malaysia after 1971. This is likely to cause the retention of Australian forces in 
Malaysia after 1971.365 Since 1967, Canberra already knew that eventually, it would be 
left with only two choices  leave or take over Britains role366. Just one day before 
Wilson announced the withdrawal, TA wrote, Tomorrows announcement from London 
detailing the speed-up of withdrawal from East of Suez will cause no surprises in 
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Canberra tomorrow367. According to this article, it was pessimism towards the British that 
led Australia to seriously contemplate that it must remain in Singapore after the British 
left. 
 
Did Australia, New Zealand and Singapore completely give up on the British? Some 
believed that there was still hope after the 1970 elections in Britain because the 
Conservative Party would revert, as it claimed, to a firmer military position in Southeast 
Asia368. In June 1968, the five-power talks were convened in KL to discuss new military 
arrangements. Perhaps an Australian and New Zealand presence could convince the 
British to stay as well? Unfortunately, in October 1968, Hasluck commented to his 
ANZUS counterparts that while the British were more responsive during the June talks in 
KL, Canberra was still mindful of Britains overall weakness. Britains financial situation 
would not change even after the elections, thus, while the dialogue continued, the 
Australians and New Zealand kept in mind that Britains financial problems were too 
serious and Londons foreign policy too self-centred to give realistic hope to 
Australasias part of the world369. Grant commented in his book, In other words, the 
value of the (British) commitment is not that it continues Australias forward defence, 
for which purpose it is inadequate, nor that it brings Britain back as a force to Southeast 
Asia. Which it did not, but that it is an aid to stability in Southeast Asia while a major 
realignment of forces in the Asia-Pacific region is taking place370. Thus, if Australia 
chose to keep its forces in Southeast Asia, it needed to secure a greater US role for the 
region after 1968371. Clearly, by 1968, the realignment towards US predominance was 
irreversible. The fact that while talks were ongoing with the British, the Australians were 
planning a new defence orientation with the US proved that Canberra placed little hope in 
London by 1968.  
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Added to the problems of Vietnam and the uncertainty of the US continuing interest in 
Southeast Asia, Gorton, throughout 1968, pondered his options and created the 
impression that he was indecisive: a perception that earned him derision372.  Australias 
deliberation however, betrayed the fact that something revolutionary was taking place. 
Canberra would not be prudent if it did not have great stakes in the region. Clearly, 
Southeast Asia was no longer just about great power interests but Australian ones as well. 
Adding stress to the problem, the US would not underwrite the security of Southeast Asia 
with additional deployments373. Since Straits forces were not ready to take on such a role, 
the onus fell on the next country that had great interests there, Australia. However, with 
what would it assume this burden? 
 
Foreign policy commentators argued that in the face of uncertainty, Australia could trust 
no one to secure its own interests but itself. In January 1968, the FAD Cabinet 
Committee tasked to study Australias role in Southeast Asia recommended a positive 
posture towards SEA and Australias policy should be in line with the the policies of 
the major power in the region.374 The major power in Southeast Asia was obviously the 
US and not Britain. Furthermore, a decisive action would in turn lead to a multiplier 
effect on Australias influence and position because a clear, strong Australian stand that 
benefited great power interests would bring in great power support375. Obviously, the US 
was the desired audience for such an argument: an Australian decision would invariably 
wish to affect an American one. But how could the unwilling giant be persuaded? 
 
In October 1967, Nixon addressed the Congress of American alliances in Southeast Asia. 
In his speech, he was not speaking about SEATO but instead, of alliances that comprised 
of regional nations. All according to him shared the same economic concerns, and the 
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similar fear of China376. He said that  It has the distinct advantage of including Australia 
and New Zealand, which share the danger and would be able to contribute substantially 
to its strength, without an unbalancing great power presence.377 In this case, he 
considered Southeast Asias connection to Australia and New Zealand as an enhancement 
of regional strength. This 1967 speech was significant because despite being perceived to 
be less concerned for Southeast Asia than LBJ, Nixon revealed that Americas perception 
of Southeast Asia would not change with his election.  
 
However, Australia would not act unless the Americans endorsed it. Up till October 
1967, Holt wanted a US assurance before he committed Australia to the Straits. That 
month, FRUS recorded that, Prime Minister Holt desires to know to what extent the 
US would be prepared to support Australia if it decides to retain its military presence in 
this area after the British depart.378  Was the US really unwilling?  The Hasluck-Rusk 
episode  in October 1967 gives some clues. 
 
 
The Hasluck-Rusk Episode: ANZUS Support for Australia 1963-1967 
 
Reminiscent of Barwicks episode in 1963, what took place between Hasluck and Rusk 
revealed the consistency of US support for Australia and New Zealand in the Straits 
throughout the 1960s. On 9 October 1967, Hasluck went to Washington to clarify US 
expectations of Australia and New Zealand when the British withdrew, and whether the 
ANZUS treaty covered Australia and New Zealand troops based in the Straits. He linked 
Singapore and Malaysia to the security of the entire Southeast Asia; thus making it vital 
to the US stake in the region. He also made clear that Australia and New Zealand, after 
close consultations, was predisposed to stay, and this coincided with Singapores and 
Malaysias wishes. The only problem was whether it had Washingtons support through 
ANZUS379? 
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Hasluck pointed out that the spirit of ANZUS (emphasis mine) must apply, not 
necessarily the form, as a blunt application of ANZUS further committing already 
stretched US resources in Southeast Asia would not sit well with the American public380. 
He said that Australia understood this, and a quiet but full understanding of the US on 
this matter might be enough to persuade the Australians to commit themselves381. Rusk 
replied that he agreed. It was recorded, As to ANZUS, he agreed with Hasluck that it 
applied to Australian and New Zealand forces, but hoped that this would not be 
mentioned in so many words.382 
 
Because of Vietnams impact on US domestic opinion, Hasluck had to be more sensitive 
than Barwick and Menzies in 1963. In response to Hasluck, Rusk replied: 
 
The applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces in Malaysia and 
Singapore has not been a matter of Congressional or public attention and 
we would not want it to be a matter for domestic discussion now. 
Therefore in its public handling of a decision to locate forces in the 
peninsular, we would not favour Australia justifying or explaining in 
terms of our ANZUS commitments.383 
 
 
That explained why on 3 Jun 1968, Gorton, though sure that the US would not leave 
Southeast Asia, would not elaborate publicly on the applicability of ANZUS to 
Australian and New Zealand forces in the Straits after his visit to Washington384. Also, on 
9 Oct 1968, the SMH still reported that Australia needed to know the level of US 
commitment before taking on a set of US-Asian goals385. There was great public 
anxiety because the US would not openly commit itself to Australias and New Zealands 
assistance in the Straits. No doubt that the government honoured US desires to keep 
private what transpired between Rusk and Hasluck in 1967. 
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True enough, the official US response to the press 2 days after Australia and New 
Zealand declared its intention stay in Singapore on 25 February 1969 was: 
 
The US today welcomed the decision of Australia and New Zealand to 
retain security forces in Malaysia and Singapore as a move that will 
strengthen stability in the area. At the same time this would not 
extend US commitment to Malaysia and Singapore because of the US 
participation in the ANZUS treaty.386 (emphasis mine)  
 
Yet at a later date on 9 August 1969, US Secretary of State William Rogers admitted, 
The US would live up (emphasis mine) to its treaty obligations in the event of an 
external attack on Australian and New Zealand troops in Malaysia and Singapore.387 
 
In November 1969, demonstrating a better understanding of American concern for 
secrecy, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gordon Freeth told Rogers that, regarding whether 
ANZUS would apply to Australian forces in Singapore after 1971, The Australian 
government did not want a precise definition since we felt that if the US was asked to 
commit itself too far in advance the answer would probably be no.388 
 
The Basis of Assurance : Mutual Interest and cooperation 
 
By August 1968, the US State department thought that Australia should do everything it 
can to maintain a military presence in Southeast Asia.389  In doing so, any inadequacies 
would be met with a very sympathetic response from Washington.390 McNamara 
underscored this very important aspect of US foreign policy by saying, It is the policy of 
the US to encourage and achieve a more effective partnership with peace-keeping 
responsibilities.391 The basis of assurance was unchangeable mutual interests. In October 
1968 during the ANZUS Council Meeting, responding to Holyoakes question on 
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whether the US would support Australian and New Zealand forces in the Straits after the 
British departure, Rusk replied that he: 
 
found the implication that this question, namely that there was doubt 
about the continuance of the American role in the area, difficult to 
understand since the US was demonstrating by what it was now doing in 
the area that it has a deep interest in its future.392 
 
Hasluck assured Rusk that he appreciated that US actions were louder than words and 
American support should be understood in the context of shared vital interests. This 
appreciation of unspoken US support based on mutual interest and not the text of a treaty 
was not without precedent. In August 1963, when Australian representatives asked if the 
US assurances given to Australian forces in Malaysia should be properly recorded, 
McGeorge Bundy said, these things really did not matter because we both knew where 
our mutual interests lay, and could rely on one another in the event of real trouble.393 
 
A visible support for US efforts in Southeast Asia also helped reduce any resistance to 
American assistance to Southeast Asia. The Cabinet Minutes of 4 June 1968 reported 
that: 
 
It is probable that they (the US) saw the value of an Australian presence in 
Malaysia/Singapore principally in terms of public relations in America, 
and against this background, it is likely the size of the presence and the 
military capability were not significant and that a token force is 
acceptable. The Prime Minister felt that the Americans were disposed to 
help and would probably help if Australian forces in the region faced a 
military challenge, but that this would depend on the circumstances at the 
time.394 
 
How could the US not defend the Straits if it had to help Australia and New Zealand in 
times of crisis? An openly declared commitment to defend additional Southeast Asian 
countries was impossible because of Vietnam, but extending support to Australia and 
                                                
392NAA-A1838-686/2/10-18 ACM, Communiqué, 10 October 1968 . 
393 NAA-A1838-19 ACM Comment by McGeorge Bundy, Washington telegram 2319 28 August 1963. 
394 NAA-A1838-19 ACM 1969-Cabinet Minute: Report by Prime Minister on visit to the US, Canberra 4 
June 1968. 
 95
New Zealand was acceptable. This non-committal form of assurance allowed the US to 
manoeuvre its way around difficult public scrutiny.  In June 1968, Australias analysis of 
the reactions of Southeast Asian leaders, in preparation for an Australian presence in 
Singapore, further confirmed the importance of an ANZUS presence. For example, on 
10-11 June 1968, Canberra said the Singaporeans: 
 
envisage any Australian forces being the means of ensuring further 
support in the event of threats to their security and hope this could be the 
means of obtaining some American support in view of our ANZUS 
alliance. The PM of Singapore put the matter most graphically with his 
allusion to Australias and New Zealands presence as the tip of the 
(ANZUS) iceberg395. (emphasis mine) 
 
And the Malaysians: 
 
welcome the continued presence of your (Australian and New Zealand) 
land forces, believing that these are the essential ingredient maintaining 
peace and stability. In the final analysis, their presence would not be 
evaluated on what they can necessarily achieve but on what they 
represent (emphasis mine) and can contribute to the totality of the effort 
in maintaining peace and stability in the area.396  
 
Since January 1968, Singapore and Malaysia knew that the Australian and New Zealand 
presence connected their security to American power. Interviewing a diplomat in London 
that month, The USNWR reported: 
 
The US would not maintain forces in these (former British) bases - at least 
initially. But leaders in Malaysia and Singapore insist privately that any 
new defence agreement must be underwritten by US military power.397 
 
                                                
395 NAA, Report on 5 Power Defence Talks Australian Military Presence in Malaysia and Singapore 
Kuala Lumpur 10-11 June 1968 pp. 15-6. Lee Hsien Loong said in 1990 that the FPDA meant more than 
numbers, because it connected Singapore to the FPDA partners allies. Thus, any aggressor had to consider 
the web of alliances Singapore was entwined with. See Pacific Defence Reporter (PDR), Vol. XVI No. 8 
February 1990 pp. 32-3. 
396 Ibid. 
397 USNWR Vol. 64 29 January 1968. See also NAA-A1383/682/4-DEA  Singapore 19 August 1965. In 
1965, Lee wanted private assurances from the US that it would not abandon the smaller states in 
Southeast Asia. 
 96
How could US forces underwrite the Straits if it was not even there? A new security 
structure was being constructed with the US as the nucleus and Australia and New 
Zealand as its proxies.  
 
The phenomena of being welcomed in Southeast Asian was another major argument for 
Australian intervention, as Indonesia did not favour a western presence. However, 
Australian troops were already familiar and considered as a stabilising presence rather 
than a colonial reminder398. What was Indonesias reaction to Australias participation in 
the Straits?  
 
After the fall of Sukarno, Indonesian-Australian ties were already on the mend. The 
landmark visit by Hasluck to Indonesia in January 1967 brought both strategic and 
economic benefits: focusing on the fact that neighbours have inseparable interests. More 
importantly, Haslucks visit was an acknowledgement of Indonesias importance to 
regional stability399. It thus had a stake to ensure the economic and political viability of 
its huge Asian neighbour. Indonesia too recognised that Australian aid was crucial if it 
needed to strengthen itself against subversion400. During Haslucks visit, the possibility of 
extending a cultural exchange agreement to further understanding was discussed401. Proof 
of a closer relationship was obvious by 1969: the number of students learning the 
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Indonesian language in Australian schools increased. Altogether, there were about 50 
high schools that offered Bahasa Indonesia402. 
 
Haslucks meeting inevitably also focused on the mutual threat of Communism and the 
uncertainty posed by the Vietnam War. Very significantly, Influential military newspaper 
KOMPAS felt that Australia, as part of the region, could play a stabilising role in the 
region. Commenting on ties: 
 
As a neighbouring country, Australia has worries about Peoples Chinas 
expansionistic tendencies. It is certain, that with the decline of 
Communism in Indonesia, Australia feels much relieved. This happy 
coincidence (Australia and Indonesia shying away from Communism) is 
our main source of mutual cooperation. Geographically, Australia lies 
within the region of Asian or Southeast Asian countries.403. (emphasis 
mine) 
 
This entente since January 1967 was significant because of past rivalry over troubled 
areas like Papua New Guinea404. Hailing Haslucks talks on the controversial West Irian-
Papua New Guinea as an amiable success, it was evident that relations were healing405. 
Indonesias acceptance was based on recognising Australia as a neighbour. Although 
Jakarta felt wary of Canberras military ties with the US and Britain, a new level of trust 
based on common interests was evident406. Finally, on 23 January 1968, TA published 
that Indonesia declared its acceptance of an Australian presence in Singapore because it 
contributed to the stability of the Straits407. On 25 February 1969, the day Australia and 
New Zealand declared its intention to remain, Malik said that, Southeast Asian defence 
must be a Southeast Asian responsibility.408 He further added: 
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towards the west. For example, R. E. Elson pointed out that Suhartos economic and political architects for 
the New Order were mostly western-trained academics. See Elson, R. E Suharto: A Political Biography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2001) p. 148. 
406 NAA-Armed Forces Daily Mail 23 January 1967. 
407 TA, 23 January 1968.  
408 JT, 11 March 1969. 
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Co-operation was needed between the countries of Southeast Asia so that 
we are strong enough to cope with any effort at interference in order to 
divide us in Southeast Asia . sure that Southeast Asia would be able to 
defend themselvesand the presence of foreign troops were not 
conducive to the well-being of countries of the region.409 
 
By 1969, Jakarta accepted Australian and New Zealand troops in Singapore as part of the 
regions effort to maintain stability. However, recent documents revealed that it was 
Americas acquiescence on Indonesias take over of West Irian and Washingtons 
moderation of Canberra-Jakarta relations that played a major role in the rapprochement 
between Australia and Indonesia: it was clear by 1969 that the US was the predominant 
influence between the two countries410. This revealed that the congruence of national 
interests between traditional enemies, plus the common recognition on the importance of 
the US in the Straits had brokered a new, if wary relationship411. While Indonesia 
opposed any great power presence in the Straits, it accepted an Australian and New 
Zealand presence and overall American leadership, albeit indirectly, in Southeast Asia 
412. However, one must bear in mind that when interests clashed, as demonstrated during 
the Confrontation, ANZUS would not be infinitely patient towards Indonesia, Although 
both countries strived for a harmonious relationship, the mutual sense of potential threat 
                                                
409 JT, 25 February 1969. 
410 NSA-GWU-Dept of State, Telegram from Embassy in Djakarta to SecState, Washington DC 28 May 
1969. 
411 What was the common threat faced? JT editorial  Malaysia and Thailand Threatened by Communist 
Insurgents 31 January 1969 fingered the Chinese community in Southeast Asia for the possibility of 
Communist subversion. Australia and New Zealands concern, however, was the possibility of racial 
tensions between the Malays and Chinese. The 1965 separation of Singapore from Malaysia proved that 
racial conflict could lead to instability  a situation that the Communist could exploit if the Chinese 
minority, when cornered, turned to China for support. Thus, at some point, Australias, New Zealands and 
Indonesias concern met. See Trengrove, John Grey Gorton p. 205 and Zagoria, Donald S.  Who Fears the 
Domino Theory in The New York Times Magazine 21 Apr 1968, reprinted in Survival Vol. X No. 6 June 
1968. Canberra was concerned that Washington might not fully appreciate the volatility of the racial mix. 
See NAA-A1838-18 ACM  American Attitude to Singapore/Malaysia 1968.  
412 ST, 26 April 1969. See also Indonesian ambassador to the US speech at the Centre for Cultural and 
Technical Interchange between East and West in Honululu, Hawaii on 14 May 1969 in Survival Vol. XI, 
October 1969. Jakartas ambassador to the US summed up clearly Indonesias position. Indonesia 
recognised that the only force against subversion was a strong and stable society: hence it welcomed 
ANZUS economic aid and ASEAN cooperation. However, when it came to defence, Indonesia felt that 
Southeast Asia could not be left a power vacuum. Although Jakarta was in no doubt about American pre-
eminence, the vacuum should be filled by a Southeast Asian power to prevent any instability resulting from 
great power rivalry. In the absence of a truly indigenous Southeast Asian power, Australia and New 
Zealand clearly fitted the bill as part of Southeast Asia.      
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lurked beneath the congeniality. The Australian document NAA-A1838-ANZUS 18 
Council Meeting Indonesia 1968 hinted at this unspoken apprehension. The document, 
discussed during 18th ANZUS Council Meeting, stressed that aid to Indonesia should not 
lead to an over-development of Jakartas armed forces, with careful control of military 
supplies despite good ties with Suhartos government. Australian-Indonesian ties could 
best be summed up as a form of wary co-existence.  
 
 Furthermore, The Indonesians considered the continuing Australian and New Zealand 
presence in the Straits as one that was within the existing treaty agreement: AMDA and 
the ANZAM understanding.  In fact, Jakarta in 1968 insisted that Australias and New 
Zealands presence must be legally justified as part of Commonwealth agreements413. 
Yet, the ANZAM  was actually only an agreement to consult and plan military activities 
and did not specify any obligation to garrison forces414. Also, AMDA was an agreement 
made between London and KL; Australia was only an associate. Thus, Australia had the 
right to withdraw. In fact, Canberra was initially quick to point out that it was not legally 
obligated to remain, lest Singapore, Malaysia and the US automatically assumed that 
Australia would take responsibility. This was specifically spelled out in 1967 because it 
wanted to keep their options open until it had weighed all choices415. Yet, Indonesia 
recognised a treaty that did not legally exist because it could buffer US interests and 
presence in the Straits.416  
 
Influential press editorials throughout 1968 argued that Australia should not squander the 
quasi-official relationship it had with Singapore and Malaysia. Instead, Australia should 
maximise its unique position to secure its interests in Southeast Asia. If Australia did not 
                                                
413 NAA-A1838-686/2/10-18 ACM  Indonesia 1968. 
414 Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy  p.165. 
415 NAA-A4940/CI473/Pt 3-CMD No. 771 FAD Committee Canberra, 11 December 1967 pp. 2-3. 
Trengrove explained that the deliberation was a result of the PMs need for more information before he 
committed Australia to this course of action, for fear of ending up being the only white military nation in 
Southeast Asia. See Trengove, John Grey Gorton pp. 208-9. 
416 AWM-121-211/C/3-Defence Chiefs of Staff Committee ANZAM Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC): 
The Threat to Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore up to March 1969, 11-12 March 1968 pp. 2-3. The 
committee concluded that Indonesia secretly wished for a western presence to buffer against the instability 
in the north. See NAA-A4940-C4626-Australian Defence Policy- Implications of UK Withdrawal on 
Malaysia/Singapore CMD No. 12 Canberra, 25 January 1968 p. 4 and Farrell, Between 2 Oceans, p. 316.  
AMDA no longer included Singapore after Separation. 
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rise to the occasion, it would like Britain, never have a chance again. The goodwill build 
up under the Commonwealth would be lost forever if Australia withdrew or gave the 
impression it was withdrawing: others like China could fill the vacuum. It should instead 
remain to encourage the Asians and the US, thus boosting Australias own position in 
Southeast Asia 417. Canberras position was further complicated by Singapores disturbing 
attitude towards welcoming great powers into the region. The Foreign Minister, S. 
Rajaratnam, said that he welcomed any great power, including Russia and China if they 
could bring a balance to the region418. While it was ambiguous whether Singapore really 
meant that, Australia took it seriously. Given the context of Commonwealth association 
and a blossoming American friendship, Singapore would in all likelihood prefer a non-
Communist presence over a Communist one419. Statements regarding the other powers 
were likely to have been made with the intention of emphasising the politically 
inoffensive concept of  equal friendship because Lee himself observed that the non-
alignment policy of third-world countries was nothing more than a theoretical stance; 
which meant it was useless for ones defence.420. Considering Singapore to be a nut in 
a nutcracker since 1965 i.e. sandwiched between two potentially hostile Muslim nations, 
Lee had good reasons to abandon neutrality and welcome an ANZUS presence421. Yet, 
as far as was possible, Singapore was careful not to side openly with any western power, 
overtly criticise or follow the Containing China rhetoric.  
                                                
417 TA 22 January 1969 Similar to the arguments for Australia not to attempt a hasty withdrawal from 
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418 ST, 15 October 1969. 
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associated with advanced, western nations. See Chan, Singapores Foreign Policy in JSEAS Vol. X, 
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Hints Towards Staying in SEA 
 
After Britains announcement in January, Gorton made a speech in Washington on 28 
June 1968 and hinted that Australia would stay with US support: 
 
I hope that you (US) in your greatness now and we in our present 
strengthwill together give protection to a new world in Asia.We 
Australians see out of perspective because it is here that we, as part of the 
Southeast Asia region live and breathe and have our present and future. It 
is here we feel that we can best contribute to stability.422 
 
 
TA commented on 29 May 1968 in an editorial about the Prime Ministers speech: 
 
The Prime Minister told LBJ, the US government and each of the 
presidential candidates exactly where Australia stood in the testing times 
ahead in Southeast Asia. Gortons choice of words were very 
carefulhe was speaking to the US in an election year. what Mr. 
Gorton seemed to be saying in Washington was notAustralia cannot 
play a role in Asia unless the US stays there  but rather that, as the US is 
going to stay there, Australia will have a meaningful role423.   
 
 
The following month, Whitlam echoed the same sentiments: 
 
 
There are some matters in which Australia can play a direct part 
irrespective of what other nations may do but it should be a major 
objective of our foreign policy to encourage other nations, particularly the 
US to assist in this essential task of rebuilding the defences in this the 
most turbulent and deprived area of the world.We cannot expect nations 
more than 12 000 miles from our region to display more interests than we 
ourselves who are part of the region.424  
 
 
                                                
422 TA, 28 May 1968. 
423 TA, 29 May 1968. 
424 NAA, Whitlam Beyond Vietnam 13 July 1968 p. 28. 
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The only difference between Labor and Liberal was whether a garrison in the Straits was 
the correct strategy or not. Whitlam considered deployment an ineffective defence plan 
because it was too small to meet any real threats. Instead, he advocated a policy of 
retaining troops in Australia but conducting regular exercises to demonstrate its ability to 
deploy to the Straits425. Yet, in May 1969, speaking in the House of Representatives to 
reinforce Australias decision to stay in the Straits, he continued to focus on the 
importance of ANZUS to Southeast Asia. He said: 
 
 A world power (US)- a Pacific power-must of necessity take an interest in 
Southeast Asia.. It should be our policy to influence America to direct that 
interest into fruitful and constructive channels. There is no question but 
that America would play a crucial role in our region. Australias task is 
to encourage the US to help build the economies and societies, as well as 
the defences of the nations in our region, and to cooperate in that effort.426 
 
This proved that leaders in both parties believed that Australia and the US had a special 
destiny in Southeast Asia. But Labors idea was rejected because it would not provide 
psychological support for the US through deployment. If this condition was not fulfilled, 
ANZUS in Southeast Asia would be weakened 427. Government sources revealed a 
presence was important because: 
 
.the decision to deploy Australian forces to Malaysia/Singapore...had in 
them elements of Australias own strategic purposes. In extension of 
this view, it was argued that it was a basic Australian objective to have 
the US maintain their presence in SEA and that, by remaining in 
Malaysia/Singapore and avoiding any impression of withdrawal, 
Australia would help strengthen US resolve.428 (emphasis mine) 
 
While the two parties disagreed on the means, the aims remained the same because by the 
late 1960s, there was an increasing consensus that Australia is Asian by geography429. By 
                                                
425 TA 28 February 1969. 
426 NAA, AH, 22 May 1969 pp. 2163-4. 
427NAA,  Report on 5 Power Defence Talks, p.17. 
428 NAA-A5868/282-CMD no. 543 Australian Presence in Malaysia/ Singapore Canberra 19 September 
1968 pp. 5-6.  
429 NAA, Whitlam Beyond Vietnam13 July 1968 p.37 See also, Millar,  Australia and Asia pp. 250-3. 
Millar elaborates that Australia is Asian by geography, thus, any events that affected SEA affected 
Australia. Therefore, Australia should have an influence over events in Southeast Asia. This shift in 
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mid-1968, although Canberra had not made up its mind, there were sufficient hints that 
Australia was predisposed towards staying in Singapore without the British. 
 
A US Base in Singapore? 
 
On 5 July 1969, The New York Times (NYT) published an article that said the US Navy 
was quietly seeking a formula for the use of the well-equipped former British naval base 
here (Singapore) for repairs and maintenancenot only of the dockyard but also of the 
maintenance shops at the air bases430  
 
Americas interest was not sudden. In October 1967, during the Hasluck-Rusk meeting, 
the Australian foreign minister, in expanding the possibilities of securing a US presence 
in the Straits, sounded the Americans on the possibility of American support/usage of the 
base in Singapore431. Singapores strategic location was an attractive option for the 
American navy. Australia was prepared to play a negotiating role, as the US did not want 
to make a formal approach towards Lee yet432. Using Australias relationship as a bridge 
between Singapore and Washington, Canberra tried to broker a stronger set of Singapore-
US ties that would benefit Australian interests in the Straits433. An Australian report on 
the Five Power Talks in June 1968 wrote, 
                                                                                                                                            
orientation was sparked off when Menzies became disillusioned with Britains increasing focus on Europe 
at the expense of Asian affairs. Menzies, known to be more British than the British 
, would not have changed direction if the impact of Britains actions on Australia was not severe. By 1967, 
his predecessors and Hasluck, strongly influenced by him, were steering the country in this direction. See 
Daryample, Continental Drift pp. 62-3.  
430 The New York Times (NYT) 5 July 1969. 
431 FRUS-XXVII Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs 
to the JCS, Washington, 13 October 1967. 
432 Although in the end the agreement did not follow through between Singapore and the US, this was an 
indication of Australian desire to ensure a US presence in Southeast Asia alongside its own contributions. 
Australia would do what it could to ensure that the US supported their position in the straits. However, this 
laid the foundation for an eventual agreement between the US and Singapore for US warships/planes to use 
Singaporean facilities, thus placing Singapore as a de facto ally of the US in Southeast Asia. See 
unpublished thesis, Williamson, Samuel G. The Development of Singapores Defence 1965-93 The 
National University of Singapore, Department of History Honours 1993 pp 56-7. This was possible only 
because Singapore recognized that the US was the only power strong enough to check the Soviets in the 
1980s and also because Singapore was more secure by the 1980s to align. Although not seen clearly, it 
should be noted that the roots of this policy were sown because of the ANZUS involvement as a result of 
the British withdrawal. 
433 See Millar, T. B. Australians should Stick in Survival Vol. X. No. 7 196.8 
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The more recent stance was that the US were already using Singapore 
commercial facilitiesas providing an alternative against the possibility 
of naval facilities being restricted or withdrawn either in Philippines or 
Japantheir use of the base would have economic benefits and provide a 
not-too-obvious presence which they understood was what Lee 
wantedThey (US) asked us (Australia) to explore the possibilities434. 
 
When Canberra approached Singapore on this, the islands leaders were receptive to 
Australian overtures made on behalf of the US, which could not approach Singapore out 
rightly for tactical reasons435. 
 
 Fry, in his book Australias Regional Security, said the Australian government 
concluded: 
 
The American interest (in Southeast Asia) is of great significance to us. 
We should do all we can to encourage it, even if this led us to provide 
some modest resources.436 
 
 
The lease discussions provided another piece of evidence that Australia and Singapore 
wanted strongly to secure a US presence in the Straits. There were 6 Australian 
representatives and only 1 New Zealander negotiating with the US. Furthermore, it was 
Gorton who negotiated directly with the new administration in Washington437. Although 
Australia was the primary negotiator, a telegram sent in July 1968 from Wellington to 
Canberra revealed New Zealands support for the idea: 
 
From our point of view this US interest is welcomed. This proposal 
would constitute a US military presence in an area of strategic 
importance to NZ. Nevertheless the fact that the Americans were using 
the Singapore dockyard-and given their reservations about the long-term 
availability of present bases in the Philippines and Japan their reliance on 
the facilities at Singapore can be expected to increase-would be calculated 
                                                
434 NAA, Report on Five Power Defence Talks at KL 10th-11th June 1968 p. 11. 
435NAA, Report on Five Power Defence Talks   p. 12. 
436 Fry, Australias Regional Security pp. 11-13. 
437 ANZ-LONB-106/2/10-Pt.1-Telegram from Wellington to Canberra US Interest in Singapore Naval 
Base 24 February 1969.  
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to increase American interest in the security and stability of the island and 
of Malaysia also.438 
 
 
Securing even a small American stake would be a breakthrough because there would be 
no more ambiguity about the US commitment to ANZUS in the Straits. The Singapore 
base negotiations indicated that by the late 1960, instead of joining the US, this time, 
Australias and New Zealands policy was to get the US to join them. (emphasis 
mine) 
 
Taking the Plunge 
 
On 17 February 1969, Gorton made a major foreign policy speech that indicated a step 
towards a commitment to the Straits. As expected, Australian newspapers wholeheartedly 
supported this move. This announcement was also meant for US ears as Gorton made it 
clear that should Australian and local forces fail to halt external aggression, Australia 
expected allied assistance. Gorton said, 
 
If, in the event of external Communist aggression, the combined forces of 
Malaysia, Singapore and Australia are unable to cope. We will then look 
to the support of allies outside the region. Clearly, we would both look and 
expect. The next move is up to the US439. 
 
The MA commented on 18 February 1969 that: 
 
This decision will have the most profound political and diplomatic impact. 
It will be seen in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and more importantly in 
Washington as Australias continuing and serious involvement in the 
security of the area.440 
 
 
The paper added that, Gorton laid the ghost of Fortress Australia to rest. This implied 
that Australia could no longer be isolated from Southeast Asian affairs, and rightly so441. 
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And the Canberra Times, on 18 February 1969 stressed, The effects of Mr. Gortons 
speech upon Mr. Nixon is predictable.442  
 
Finally, on 25 February 1969, Australia took the plunge. Gorton said in the House of 
Representatives that day that Australia would remain because, 
 
For Malaysia, Singapore and New Zealand, and ourselves this latest 
announcement underlined the fact that an era has ended Our own 
starting point was and is that we are a part of and are situated in the 
region. Hence security, stability and progress for the other nations in the 
region must also contribute to the security of Australia. We cannot fail to 
be affected by what happens in our neighbours countries. What affects 
their security affects our security.443 
 
The ST commented on 28 February 1969 that, Australia and New Zealand will not regret 
a decision which contains within it that rarest and best of combinations - genuine 
helpfulness to friends and a high degree of self-service.444  
 
By basing in Singapore, political mileage was gained with Southeast Asia and the US at 
little risk. Australias deployment was calculated not to deal with any real threat because 
Australia knew it neither could nor seriously needed to do so, but to address the vital 
security perceptions of its allies445. Given American assurances, whom would the US 
defend Australia and New Zealand against? Superficially, the alleged threat was the 
potential re-emergence of a hostile Indonesia or Chinese subversion, but with ASEAN 
growing stronger and Indonesian-ANZUS ties improving, conflict was unlikely446. 
                                                
442 The Canberra Times in St, 18 February 1969. Nixon himself however, was pleased by Australias 
decision and pledged US support for Australia in the straits. See NAA-A1838-18 ACM  Nixon-Gorton 
Talks Produce Close Understanding and the PMs speech to parliament 15 May 1969. 
443 Statement by PM Gorton in the House of Representatives 25 February 1969. 
444 ST, 28 February 1969. 
445 NAA-A1838-19 ACM 1969-Cabinet Minute: Report by PM on visit to the US, Canberra 4 June 1968. 
The US had no objections to the fact that Australia could only contribute a token force to Singapore. 
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446 ASEAN brought not just closer ties but also stronger and more stable societies and economies that made 
Communism unattractive. Moreover, some academics believed the China threat was over-rated due to a 
bias interpretation of Chinese politics and foreign policy. See Soedjatmoko, Southeast Asia and Security 
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Washington could also rein Ferdinand Marcos from making territorial claims on Borneo. 
Thus, the menace was largely hypothetical. For Australia and the US, the Straits 
involvement was a low risk, high return investment. Australia gained influence, and the 
US was reassured, all with a relative low-risk deployment. The Australian decision was 
therefore a win-win situation because it helped itself by showing itself helpful to its 
friends, almost at no danger to itself. The Economist commented that for Australia, its 
move was dependent on the amount of support it received from its key allies, 
 
If things got so bad that the local troops and those from Australia and New 
Zealand could not cope, it would be necessary to look to allies outside the 
region, which presumable means Britain but might also mean the US. 
Further, Australias contribution would depend on how much those allies 
were prepared to offer447. 
 
 
Not unexpectedly, American immediate reaction, though not headline news, was 
favourable. The NYT reported on 26 February 1969: 
 
Although the numbers will not be large as compared to the Britishtheir 
continuing presence was seen as lessening the need for a possible, 
unilateral US commitment in that area. Any such commitment would be 
politically difficult internationally and in this countryofficials expressed 




The USNWR reinforced the NYT a week later on how Washington perceived the Australia 
and New Zealand contribution in its article Asias Self-Defence Plan: A Hedge Against 
US Pull-out. It bestowed upon Canberra the leadership of a new anti-Communist 
alliance made up of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore449.  Significantly, 
Australia and New Zealand were labelled as Asians by the influential American 
journal450. This insight proved that a change in security structure had taken place: a 
                                                                                                                                            
Survival Vol. XI No. 10 October 1969 and Richard Harris, How the Chinese View SEA in The Times 
(London) 8 September 1970. 
447 The Economist  1 March 1969. 
448 NYT, 26 February 1969. 
449 USNWR, 10 March 1969. 
450 Ibid. 
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framework based on Australia and New Zealands  Asia-ness. With the impending 
British withdrawal, Washington saw the European-US alliance in Southeast Asia being 
replaced with a US-Asian/ANZUS one.  
 
The decision enhanced Australias position in Southeast Asia and ANZUS. It was no 
longer merely a protected ally under ANZUS but a partner. Australian foreign policy 
was successfully concluded because it met the key criterion of gaining the respect of the 
US, winning the trust of Indonesia and tying Singapore and Malaysian security to 
American power.451Australian cooperation with the US from 1965-1969 was best 
summarised by the catch phrases of the Prime Ministers of the era, Harold Holt and John 
Gorton. Going all the way with LBJ in 1965, Australia was a follower and supporter 
of US policy. By 1969, Australia acted independently alongside America as a partner in 
the Straits of Malacca. As Gorton put it, Australia would go Waltzing Matilda with the 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
ANZUS in the Straits: An Enduring Legacy? 
 
The success of ANZUS in Southeast Asia could not have happened without Australian 
and New Zealand interest in the area. From 1969 onwards, Australasia could not break 
away from a closely linked destiny with Southeast Asia. From 1969 till the 1990s, there 
was a sharp emphasis on Australias connection to Asia while New Zealand drifted away. 
This created an awkward situation because the majority of Australians, as well as 
Southeast Asian countries rejected the notion of Australia being part of Asia453. It was not 
a new dilemma. In 1967, KOMPAS already pointed out Australias awkwardness 
balancing a European culture and an Asian geography454. However, popular opinion 
cannot alter strategic interests: Singapore, Malaysia and the US continue to be the most 
important military allies of Australia. The antipodean states guard the vital gateway to the 
Australian coast and the US the strongest and most reliable of allies455. According to the 
1993 Strategic review, Canberra still considers its contribution to Southeast Asias 
defence as a key determinant in influencing the future of American strategic policy and 
concerns in the Straits456. 
 
Our approach in the 1990s should be based on strategic partnership with 
Southeast Asia . This approach should be linked to our efforts to sustain 
our alliance relationship with the US and encourage US commitment to 
the region457. 
 
                                                
453 Dalrymple Continental Drift p. 100. 
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 This idea of being a bridge between Southeast Asia -USA is clearly a continuation of the 
1969 decision. Was this relationship lopsided, since Lee labelled Australia as deputy 
sheriff in the late 1960s? The trying East Timor affair in the late 1990s revealed that 
Australia was still independently dependent. Australia, while desirous of American 
support for its action, acted independently against Indonesia when its interests were 
threatened but ironically, this autonomy did not reduce Australias dependency on the 
US458. Washingtons cold shoulder over East Timor reflected its lack of strategic 
interests, thus the non-interference459. However, American nonchalance was no longer 
worrying since Australia is permanently secure as part of the US nuclear network460. 
This encouraged Australian assertiveness: a sign that Australia has matured strategically 
since the 1960s when it would not consider action against Indonesia without public US 
support or assurance. With the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia and Chinas rising 
dominance in the 21st century, ANZUS continues to play an important aspect of 
Australias Asian policy461. 
 
For New Zealand, despite the quarrel with Washington, Wellington continued, through 
the course of both Labour and National governments, to continue to keep its garrison in 
Singapore for the protection of the common interests of ANZUS and ASEAN462. The 
increased Soviet presence in Southeast Asia and Kampucheas instability required 
ANZUS coverage. David Lange made clear that Wellingtons tiff with the White House 
in 1986 was only restricted to the nuclear issue: New Zealand was still committed to 
other areas of ANZUS common interests e.g. ASEAN463. He said that NZs main 
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contribution to ANZUS was not merely restricted to receiving US ships but to guard a 
common set of interests in the Southeast Asia and Pacific regions464. 
 
Moreover, New Zealands rebellion against the White House could not diminish the 
security of the Straits because the Reagan administration took a position of active 
participation there465. With the introduction of an official US naval presence, the original 
mission of Australian and New Zealand forces, that of instilling an unofficial US 
guarantee in the troubled Straits, was accomplished. Though Wellington was a junior 
partner dependent on Washington and Canberras decision, it nevertheless played a part 
that the US could not have played from 1969-1990. With its role fulfilled, New Zealand 
troops finally withdrew. Minister of Foreign Affairs Russell Marshall said in May 1988: 
 
Malaysia and Singapore, have built up sizeable defence forces of their 
own since independenceThe Australian and New Zealand presence in 
the region has provided an important assurance of political support during 
the development of these national defence capabilities. The need for 
reassurance is much diminished now466. 
 
FPDA or ANZUS? 
 
In 1990, Brigadier General (BG) Lee Hsien Loong credited the FPDA to have played a 
notable and continuous role in stabilising Southeast Asia. He said that the Australian and 
New Zealand forces under the FPDA were not overwhelming forces, but not 
insignificant because it linked Singapore and Malaysia to their partners allies.467   
 
Who did Lee perceive as their partners allies? Which among the FPDA had the 
interests and ability to project power into the Straits in support of Australia, New 
Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia forces in times of crisis? Or more importantly, which of 
the FPDAs allies had the interest and ability? The cost of deployment over such a vast 
distance called for immense resources, and the end must justify the means. Would Britain 
                                                
464 FAR Vol. 36 No. 3 US Suspends ANZUS Obligations July-September 1986. 
465 Far Eastern Economic Review, Port in a Storm, 22 November 1990. 
466 FAR Vol. 38 SEA and New Zealand 13 May 1988. 
467 PDR, Vol. XVI No. 8 February 1990 pp. 32-3. 
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respond effectively if its strategic and economic interests were not threatened? Brian 
Farrell argued that the FPDA was the loosest promise to consult made in the expectation 
the call would never come.468 Britains reduction of its already miniscule commitments 
in Southeast Asia in favour of NATO in 1981 strengthened Farrells argument469. 
Singapores offer of facilities in 1989 to the US navy hinted at the importance of the US. 
If the FPDA was fully sufficient for the defence of Singapore, what need was there for 
the US presence in the Straits470? More concrete evidence could however be derived from 
Singapores desire to include an understanding with Washington within the purview of 
the FPDA in response to rising Soviet numbers. Even with an increased Australian 
participation in FPDA collaboration, Rajaratman, interviewed by TA, said: 
 
The immediate thing that will dominate international politics and security 
for the next 10 years at least is Soviet ambitions. The FPDA is no barrier 
to this kind of threat the lynchpin is the US, and things must be worked 
around the US.471 
 
America cautioned that Malaysia/Singapore could lose their non-aligned status if the US 
enters into a defence agreement with them. However, there was no need since ASEAN is 
bound to the US through common interest: common interest was enough to ensure 
Washingtons assistance.472.  However, the relevant question was, if the US had little 
interests here, would it use the Singapore base? Allegations that Washington lost interest 
in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War could, at best, be considered short-term because 
the US defeat, though traumatic, could not alter the geographic importance of the Straits 




                                                
468 Farrell, Between Two Oceans p. 327. 
469 ADJ,  Britain to Cut Down Role in FPDA, March 1981. 
470 Perhaps Singapore was afraid of being surrounded by Muslim nations, as the presence of ANZUK 
forces in the past indicated.  
471 ADJ, What Future for the FPDA, October 1981. 
472 ADJ, US Pledge to Stand by its Asian Allies November 1981. 
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1969 was a crucial year in the strategic history of the Straits. It witnessed the expression 
of irrevocable ANZUS interests in the region that changed the power structure in the 
Straits. From then on, the US, even without a tangible presence, at least until 1990, 
became the main security guarantee for the region. Henry S. Albinski interpreted 
Australias and New Zealands decision as construing an informal ANZUS presence in 
Southeast Asia 473  
 
This thesis argues that events leading up to 1969 highlighted the emerging importance of 
the Straits of Malacca to ANZUS, leading ANZUS into an irrevocable strategic 
relationship with the antipodean nations. The British, though considered important, could 
not wield the same amount of influence on Australia and New Zealand decision-making 
because London was deemed both uninterested and impotent. Even with British support 
during Confrontation, Australia and New Zealand were wary of military adventures in 
Southeast Asia without a US guarantee. In 1965, Australias and New Zealands split in 
society over Vietnam was the birth pangs that signified a new beginning as both countries 
left the comforting fold of their Commonwealth heritage and into an Asian-Pacific future. 
The announcement of 1968 confirmed Australia and New Zealands destiny in Southeast 
Asia and finally, the spirit of ANZUS enabled tripartite security concerns in the Straits to 
be addressed with US power but Australian and New Zealand presence. Were Australia 
and New Zealand deputy sheriffs of the US in 1969, as claimed by Lee Kuan Yew? They 
were neither sent nor ordered by Washington but took it upon themselves as partners with 
an equal stake and contribution. True to a partnership, each party gave of what it could to 
meet the new demands of a new era in the spirit of ANZUS. It was a successful alliance 






                                                
473 Albinski, Henry S. The US Security Alliance System in the Southwest Pacific in Ed. William T. Tow 
and William R. Feeney US Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach 
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The ANZUS Treaty 
This is the full text of the Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States of America.  
 
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CANBERRA  
Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America 
[ANZUS]  
(San Francisco, 1 September 1951)  
Entry into force generally: 29 April 1952  
AUSTRALIAN TREATY SERIES  
1952 No. 2  
Australian Government Publishing Service  
Canberra  
(c) Commonwealth of Australia 1997  
 
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY,  
REAFFIRMING their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and 
desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,  
NOTING that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed 
forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative 
responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace 
Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of 
peace and security in the Japan Area,  
RECOGNIZING that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific 
Area,  
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DESIRING to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential 
aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and  
DESIRING further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation 
of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of 
regional security in the Pacific Area,  
THEREFORE DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:  
Article I  
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any 
international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.  
Article II  
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and 
jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and 
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.  
Article III  
The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the 
Pacific.  
Article IV  
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and 
maintain international peace and security.  
Article V  
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include 
an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island 
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or 
aircraft in the Pacific.  
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Article VI  
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights 
and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the 
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  
Article VII  
The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their 
Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council 
should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.  
Article VIII  
Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the 
Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to 
maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is 
authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, 
Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the 
purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.  
Article IX  
This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as 
possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories 
of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the 
signatories have been deposited.[1]  
Article X  
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the 
Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the 
Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the 
deposit of such notice.  
Article XI  
This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government 
of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the 
Governments of each of the other signatories.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.  
DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.  
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FOR AUSTRALIA:  
[Signed:]  
PERCY C SPENDER  
FOR NEW ZEALAND:  
[Signed:]  
C A BERENDSEN  
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  
[Signed:]  
DEAN ACHESON  
JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
ALEXANDER WILEY  
JOHN J SPARKMAN  
[1] Instruments of ratification were deposited for Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States of America 29 April 1952, on which date the Treaty entered into force.  
 
 
 
